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The nascent “critical legal research” movement applies the
constellation of critical theory to the American legal research regime.
Work in this discourse has unpacked the means through which commercial
print and online legal resources (e.g., Westlaw and Lexis) insidiously
channel the efforts of legal researchers, essentially predetermining
research outcomes. Although legal research is commonly conceived as a
normatively neutral paradigm, such commercial homogenizing agents
(paired with traditional methods of legal analysis) in fact reflect and
perpetuate society’s dominant interests.
As grounded in the existing literature, this Article outlines novel
strategies that may together constitute one potential version of a critically
reconstructed legal research process. The overarching aim of this
reconstructed process is to jumpstart the development of progressive law
reform initiatives. Such key strategies include a more targeted utilization of
commercial and non-commercial legal resources, an increased practitioner
reliance upon a wide range of theoretical materials (i.e., as potential
touchstones for innovation), and the cultivation of synergistic
brainstorming sessions involving grassroots activists and other diverse
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constituents.
This Article explores the critical legal research process in the specific
context of Appalachian law reform efforts. Currently, mountaintop removal
mining is wreaking social, economic, and environmental devastation on the
region. In applying the critical research process to the sociolegal
framework governing mountaintop removal, it becomes clear that core
feminist methodologies—and the ecofeminism movement, in particular—
may yet offer crucial insights that can contribute greatly to reform efforts.
This illustrative application of critical research strategies demonstrates the
transformative potential of the novel reformist practice.
[F]ind your place on the planet. Dig in, and take responsibility from
there. . . . Even while holding in mind the largest scale of potential
change. Get a sense of workable territory, learn about it, and start acting
point by point.

—Gary Snyder1
Legends of dogwood
cover scars on coal-bleeding
Appalachia.

—Barbara Smith2
I. INTRODUCTION
It is little understood that a critical approach to the resources and
methodologies associated with the contemporary legal research process can
serve as a crucial vehicle for progressive sociolegal change—otherwise
known as normative reconstruction. However, through the work of such
scholars as Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, and Jill Anne Farmer, the
outlines of such critical legal research strategies can be discerned, and may

1. GARY SNYDER, Four Changes, in TURTLE ISLAND 91, 101 (1974). A noted
Buddhist poet and activist, Gary Snyder in his “programmatic manifesto ‘Four
Changes’ . . . outlines the kind of enterprises he believed the country needed in order to
maintain ecological diversity and make salutary changes as a culture.” See Aaron K.
DiFranco, Gary Snyder, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 61,
63 (Jay Parini ed. 2003).
2. Barbara Smith, Appalachian April, in APPALACHIA INSIDE AND OUT: CONFLICT
AND CHANGE 185, 185 (Robert J. Higgs et al. eds., 1995). Barbara Smith, author,
historian, and retired Chair of the Division of Humanities at Alderson-Broaddus
College, Philippi, West Virginia, is widely celebrated for her efforts “to improve
quality of life in Southern Appalachia.” Id.
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assist reformist-minded attorneys in achieving such change.3
The
overarching crux of the modern critical legal research process is that
attorneys ought to look beyond the deeply problematic “ready-made body
of developed law,” and should instead think “outside the box” in
“reinventing, modifying, flipping, and radically transforming legal
doctrines and theories imaginatively.”4
Although a definitive encapsulation of such a process is elusive (due to
its multifaceted and necessarily ever-evolving nature), prominent examples
of critical legal research strategies to date include the following: a more
nuanced use of premier and alternative legal research databases, based in
part on a critical deconstruction of database structure and functionality;5 a
newfound practitioner reliance upon theoretical resources as potential
touchstones for innovation, as compared to more traditional legal resources
in a vacuum;6 and a rediscovery of the profound importance of
“unplugged” brainstorming sessions as a means for achieving genuine legal
innovation.7 Much may be achieved in terms of progressive law reform by
utilizing such critical techniques in conjunction with the more traditional
legal research process.
In this Article, such critical research strategies are explored and then
examined in the specific context of the Appalachian legal research
landscape. As has been well documented, the Appalachian region of the
United States faces unique, and often pronounced, socioeconomic and
environmental challenges.8 Prominent among these issues include rural
3. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same
Questions? The Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited, 99 L. LIBR. J. 307, 308 (2007)
[hereinafter Revisited]; Jill Anne Farmer, A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal
Research Process, 85 L. LIBR. J. 391, 391-92 (1993); Jean Stefancic & Richard
Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help
or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 853-54 (1991); Steven M.
Barkan, Response to Schanck: On the Need for Critical Law Librarianship, or Are We
All Legal Realists Now?, 82 L. LIBR. J. 23, 35 (1990); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and
the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209 (1989) [hereinafter Triple Helix
Dilemma]; Virginia Wise, Of Lizards, Intersubjective Zap and Trashing: Critical Legal
Studies and the Librarian, LEGAL REFERENCE SERV. Q. 7, 12 (1988); Steven M.
Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian’s Commentary on Critical
Legal Studies, 79 L. LIBR. J. 617, 624 (1987) [hereinafter Deconstructing].
4. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328.
5. See id., at 318-25; Farmer, supra note 3, at 396-403.
6. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 403.
7. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328.
8. See Bryan C. Banks, High Above the Environmental Decimation and
Economic Domination of Eastern Kentucky, King Coal Remains Firmly Seated on Its
Gilded Throne, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2006) (“[T]hose [who] live at the
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poverty, joblessness, uneven economic development,9 sociopolitical
inequities and disenfranchisement (with special problems pertaining to
race, gender, and class subordination),10 inadequate infrastructure and
services,11 and, lastly, environmental and public health concerns associated
with the natural resource extraction industry.12
Much has been written about these issues—however, in regard to
concrete strategies for law reform in Appalachia, what remains as a fertile,
untapped resource is the potentially transformative power of the critical
approach to legal research. With this transformative potential in mind, this
Article applies the evolving framework of the critical research process, in a
preliminary sense, to an area of law in need of desperate reform in
Appalachia (and one that exists at the intersection of the issues broached
intersection of America’s eastern coalfields still struggle with abject poverty, high
unemployment, an inadequate infrastructure. . . . [and] environmental devastation.”).
9. See APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, Strategies for Economic Improvement in
Appalachia’s Distressed Rural Counties 14-16 (May 2012), available at
http://www.arc.gov/assets/research_reports/StrategiesforEconomicImprov
ementinAppalachiasDistressedRuralCounties21.pdf; see also id. at 3 (“While many
parts of Appalachia have shown significant improvements in income, public, health and
quality of life, others still languish”).
10. See SUZANNE E. TALLICHET, DAUGHTERS OF THE MOUNTAIN: WOMEN COAL
MINERS IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA 9-18 (2010) (“I expanded [a gender- and class-based]
interpretation to include race and the colonization process whereby working-class
residents of the Appalachian region were further exploited and subordinated by outside
capitalist interests, both economically and culturally.”); Debra Henderson & Ann
Tickamyer, The Intersection of Poverty Discourses: Race, Class, Culture, and Gender,
in EMERGING INTERSECTIONS: RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN THEORY, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 50, 56 (Bonnie Thornton Dill & Ruth Enid Zambrana eds., 2009) (“[W]e
argue not only do the negative stereotypes fostered in Appalachia serve to control poor
rural White women, but they sustain a broader system of welfare racism that impacts
poor minority women.”); Dan Manning-Miller, Racism and Organizing, in FIGHTING
BACK APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 57, 63 (Stephen L.
Fisher ed., 1993) (“However grim the assessment of the power of racism, this is not a
perspective that lacks faith in the ability of the southern or Appalachian white to
change—to understand her or his self-interest in terms of unity with black people.”).
11. See APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, Economic Assessment of Appalachia 14-15
(June 2010) (“[M]any significant challenges remain before the Region’s infrastructure
is at full parity with the rest of the nation . . . .”).
12. See Sam Evans, Voices from the Desecrated Places: A Journey to End
Mountaintop Removal Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 523–29 (2010). For the
greater climate change implications of global coal combustion, see Patrick C.
McGinley & Judge Charles H. Haden II, Climate Change and the War on Coal:
Exploring the Dark Side, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 310 (2011) (“Worldwide concern
about climate change has awakened the public to one of the major externalities of
coal—the fuel contributes 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions and 41% . . . of
global carbon dioxide emissions, the most common greenhouse gas.”).
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above): the law governing mountaintop removal mining. This tentative
application will demonstrate that critical legal research strategies may serve
as a powerful reform tool in the embattled Appalachian region.
This Article is divided into three parts: Part I provides an overview of the
legal publishing industry, Part II introduces the critical analysis of the
American legal research regime, and Part III applies that analysis to the
framework governing mountaintop removal mining. Part I itself is divided
into three subparts. In Part IA, the historical development of the legal
publishing industry is summarized, demonstrating that, first, the ascendant
producers of commercial legal resources—West Publishing, most
notably—have exercised a century-long marketplace hegemony.13 Seismic
shifts within the contemporary legal publishing industry have only
exacerbated this state of affairs. That is, in confluence with the rise of free
market globalization, a triumvirate of legal publishers (i.e., Thomson
Reuters, Reed-Elsevier, and Wolters Kluwer) have neutralized most thirdparty competitors, thereby creating a transnational legal publishing
oligopoly.14 That commercial legal resources constitute the most egregious
agents of homogenization for research outcomes is due—in no small
historic part—to this long-term degradation of diversity in the legal
publishing industry.15
Part IB tracks the market transition to online legal resources, and
thereafter Part IC provides a comparative analysis of the print and online
research mediums. This analysis demonstrates that, contrary to popular
perception, the transition to the online medium has not revolutionized the
legal research paradigm because commercial resources and search tools, as
rendered in online formats, continue to perpetuate the publishers’
channeling influence on research outcomes.16 Part ID details the
traditional, or unreconstructed, legal research process, revealing its
Langdellian formalist underpinnings, and thus its emphasis on a classic
search for the “one right answer” or “correct” ratio decidendi.17
Historically, legal research has been viewed as a normatively neutral
enterprise, wherein discrete legal queries are matched formulaically with
supposed binding precedent.
Part II is divided into five subparts. Part IIA and IIB introduce the
13. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds
Substance, 75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 20–22 (1987).
14. Ian Gallacher, “Aux Armes, Citoyens!” Time for Law Schools to Lead the
Movement for Free and Open Access to the Law, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 51 (2008).
15. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 397-99.
16. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 318-25.
17. See Deconstructing, supra note 3, at 619-20; Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note
3, at 316.
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emerging discourse on critical legal research. This movement applies
critical theory to the institution of American legal research: that is, to the
commercial resources and systemic methodologies associated with the
research process, as taught as a cohesive pedagogy in the law school
curriculum and utilized in practice.18 This Part demonstrates that the core
insights proffered by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement and its
theoretical progeny—i.e., that legal doctrine is incoherent and
indeterminate, and that categorizations of law are inherently problematic—
are conceptually inseparable from the formalist-based institution of legal
research.19 Through this critical lens, traditional legal research is revealed
as a wholly subjective process, and moreover, largely perpetuates the
political and ideological dictates of society’s dominant interests.20
Part IIC and IID unpack the multitudinous aspects through which legal
research, both print and online, furthers socially conservative ends. The
West Topic and Key Number system, the preeminent legal categorization
scheme, is instrumental in print legal research—and through its subjective
taxonomy of legal concepts, serves to reify the dominant ideologies of
Western liberalism.21 Online research, although supposedly freeing to the
researcher, in fact insidiously predetermines research outcomes through the
following mechanisms: search algorithms embedded with such features as
automated input from West categorization and citation systems, in addition
to crowdsourcing attributes;22 enhanced citation systems that crosslink
primary authority to editorially selected, brand-based analytical materials;23
the online medium’s facilitation of mere fact-based searching;24 and the
pitfalls of free Internet sources, including, most alarmingly, West’s
success—through its legal-conceptual hegemony—in pervasively
influencing research outcomes regardless of the resource used.25
Part IIE details strategies that may together constitute one potential
version of a critical-based, reconstructed legal research process. As
introduced above, central to such a critical process is searching outside the
“system box” of commercial legal databases—and then in adopting evercreative approaches to law reform, through such methodologies as
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See sources cited supra note 3.
See Deconstructing, supra note 3, at 632-37.
See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 308-09.
See Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 314-22.
Ronald E. Wheeler, Does WestlawNext Really Change Everything? The
Implications of WestlawNext on Legal Research, 103 L. LIBR. J. 359, 365-68 (2011).
23. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 401; Alan Wolf & Lynn Wishart, Shepard’s and
KeyCite Are Flawed (or Maybe It’s You), N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 24, 25 (2003).
24. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3 at 323.
25. See id. at 310.
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synthesizing, as applicable, existing legal concepts, emerging policy needs,
critical theory, and so on.26
Part III, which is divided into two subparts, applies the critical legal
research process, as envisioned in this Article, to the law governing
mountaintop removal mining. Part IIIA provides an overview of the
Appalachian coal extraction industry and then of mountaintop removal
mining specifically. Through the phenomenon known as the natural
resource curse, the coal extraction industry long has wrought
environmental, social, and economic devastation on the Appalachian
region.27 Moreover, in recent decades, mountaintop removal mining has
emerged in Appalachia as a dominant (and singularly destructive) form of
surface mining.28 Legal strategies to halt mountaintop removal mining
have focused on the complex federal and state regulatory scheme involving
the Surface Mining and Control Reclamation Act (SMCRA), the Clean
Water Act (CWA), and the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA).29
Specifically, environmental plaintiffs have sought federal court
enforcement of these Acts.30 Although the plain language of the CWA and
NEPA, in particular, overwhelmingly favors such plaintiffs, the Fourth
Circuit has ruled nearly without exception for the coal extraction industry.31
Potential common law remedies in tort, including negligence and nuisance
actions, also remain largely undeveloped against mountaintop removal
operations, due in large part to unfavorable political and sociolegal
conditions in the region.32
Part IIIB applies critical research strategies to mountaintop removal law.
First, this Part provides a discussion on how a hypothetical researcher may
locate such law through the traditional, concept-based legal research
26. See id. at 328.
27. See Joyce. M. Barry, STANDING OUR GROUND: WOMEN, ENVIRONMENTAL

JUSTICE, AND THE FIGHT TO END MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL 23 (2012) [hereinafter
STANDING OUR GROUND].
28. Mark Baller & Leor J. Pantilat, Comment, Defenders of Appalachia: The
Campaign to Eliminate Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining and the Role of Public
Justice, 37 ENVTL. L. 629, 631 (2007).
29. Evan Barret Smith, Implementing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: The
Social and Cultural Context of Mountaintop Removal Mining As Seen Through the
Lenses of Law and Documentaries, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 170, 179 (2012).
30. See id. at 181–85.
31. See id. But see S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758
F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2014) (ruling in favor of environmental plaintiffs). This
decision is discussed infra Part III(A)(2).
32. Sara Gersen, Note, The Potential of State Coal-Purchasing Legislation to
Decrease Mountaintop Removal Mining, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 455, 477 (2011).
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process. Second, an analysis demonstrates how the premier legal databases
channel the researcher’s efforts in locating the existing mountaintop
removal legal framework. In terms of the West Topic and Key Number
system, West editors engage in subjective legal classifications of the points
of law at issue in prominent mountaintop removal cases like Ohio Valley
Environmental Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.33 Research
outcomes also are influenced through the publishers’ practice of editorially
selecting and then crosslinking brand-based analytical resources through
citator systems to key mountaintop removal statutory sections such as
CWA § 404.34
What is more, the WestSearch algorithm uses automated input from the
West categorization and citation systems for all keyword searches
performed on the database—and thus every mountaintop removal search
performed on the database necessarily is filtered through such West
homogenizing agents.35 Finally, as the Langdellian curriculum was in fact
explicitly modeled after the legal-conceptual hierarchies of the West Topic
and Key Number system,36 the hypothetical researcher, as trained in the
American law school system, has the West conceptual framework
epistemologically “inscribed” on her mind—throughout all aspects of the
research process, and no matter the resource used.37
Part IIIB next provides a concrete example of searching beyond the
“system box” of commercial legal databases, in locating critical sources of
inspiration for novel mountaintop removal law reform initiatives. The
environmental justice movement, which details how minority and lowincome populations share disproportionately in environmental harms, has
been an active discourse both in mountaintop removal primary authority
and in legal-analytical treatment of the mining practice.38 However, a
dedicated feminist analysis of the law governing mountaintop removal
mining is wholly absent from the law and discourse. But in using crossand multidisciplinary resources, the researcher discovers that non-legal
scholars, such as Women’s Studies Professor Joyce M. Barry, have indeed
applied a feminist analysis to the Appalachian mountaintop removal
33. Ohio Valley Envt’l Coal v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’r, 883 F. Supp. 2d 627,
628-29 (S.D.W. Va. 2012) aff’d, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2013).
34. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-209).
35. See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 369.
36. Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A
Paradigm Shift?, 93 L. LIBR. J. 285, 287 (2001).
37. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310.
38. See generally Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop
Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21, 2324 (2004) [hereinafter Pick and Shovel].
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practice.39
As advised by Delgado and Stefancic, the researcher may then “unplug”
and engage in brainstorming sessions, in applying the feminist insights of
Barry and others to existing mountaintop removal law. In particular,
feminist-inspired law reform initiatives broached (tentatively) in Part IIIB
revolve,40 in part, around the extent to which women may share
disproportionately in the harms wrought by mountaintop removal mining.
Such disproportionate harms include quantifiable social and economic
hardships borne more egregiously by Appalachian women than men, in
addition to potentially increased susceptibility to toxins released in the
mining process (although, as discussed below, this latter point is a complex
one).41
New law reform initiatives may involve explicitly accounting for such
disproportionate harms in the public interest review requirements mandated

39. See generally STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27.
40. It is incumbent to acknowledge that while I am a lifelong Appalachian

resident, I also am writing this Article from the privileged perspective of a white man.
I, therefore, share Verchick’s view that “[a]s both feminism and environmental justice
emphasize the importance of people speaking for themselves, I do not presume in this
Article to speak for either environmental justice activists or for women. Rather, I offer
my arguments and analysis as, to use Mari Matsuda’s term, a ‘theoretical coconspirator.’” Robert R.M. Verchick, In A Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and
Environmental Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 27 (1996) [hereinafter Greener
Voice] (quoting Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 348 (1987)). But see Devon W.
Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 84 (2000)
(“Proponents of the ‘impossibility thesis’ seem to suggest that quite apart from what we
might want, it must be so: the impossibility of men’s relationship to feminism stems
from the very different (unequal) social reality men and women live.”). Unpersuaded
by the impossibility thesis, Carbado posits that “male feminism need not reflect male
epistemological dominance” and that moreover it can be said that “feminism is more
about ideology and political commitment than it is about male or female identity per
se.” Id. at 85. We such allies, though, ought to proceed with the utmost caution—and
in a consciously limited fashion: Male heterosexuals who participate in discourses on
gender and sexuality should avoid creating “the (mis)impression that, because they are
outsiders to the subordinating effects of patriarchy and heterosexism, their critiques of
patriarchy and/or heterosexism are more valid than those offered by lesbians, straight
women, and gay men.” Id. at 124. There remains the “ever-present danger of
overstating the male role in the feminist struggle.” Corey Rayburn, Why Are You
Taking Gender and the Law?: Deconstructing the Norms That Keep Men Out of the
Law School’s “Pink Ghetto”, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 80 (2003).
41. See generally STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27; Joyce M. Barry,
Mountaineers Are Always Free?: An Examination of The Effects of Mountaintop
Removal in West Virginia, 29 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 116 (2001) [hereinafter
Mountaineers]. See also infra Part III(B)(3).
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under the CWA permitting scheme for mountaintop removal.42
Concurrently, in line with feminist methodologies pertaining to contextual
reasoning and consciousness-raising,43 such public review processes—in
addition to other socio-institutional sites of change, such as the public
health complex—may be infused, to a greater extent, with a reliance upon
personal experiences of environmentally-affected subordinated groups.44
Such reform strategies as toxic tort litigation and legislative compensation
schemes also are discussed in this section.
Part IIIB concludes with a brief vision of more transformative reform
initiatives (i.e., initiatives targeting the systemic forces of patriarchal
liberalism at work in Appalachia), based predominantly on the core insights
of the ecofeminism movement. Such reforms may entail—beyond merely
halting mountaintop removal mining—radically restructuring the social and
economic landscape of the Appalachian region along ecofeminist lines.45
II. THE LEGAL PUBLISHING INDUSTRY
A. Historical Overview
The West Publishing Company was the foundational commercial
producer of print legal resources in the United States. West Publishing has
been in existence for over a century, providing such products as the
National Reporter system, which revolutionized the dissemination of case
law, and the West Digest system, an organizational scheme that classifies
all areas of American case law into categories (and discrete sub-categories)
known as the West Topic and Key Number system.46 Prior to the advent of
these West resources, the reporting of American law was “unsystematic
and disorganized,”47 as attorneys experienced difficulty in locating
decisions without such standardizing agents. So successful were West’s
products in providing order to the then-chaos of case law dissemination,
that the ABA eventually endorsed both systems, effectively granting West
a “semi-official status” that it still maintains to this day.48
42. See Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 33 (“Where underlying gender
differences are real, feminists seek to discredit not the assumption of differences, but
the assumption that differences justify policies burdening women more than men.”).
43. See id. at 43-53.
44. See id. at 39.
45. STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 149.
46. Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 314; see also Robert C. Berring, Chaos,
Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
189, 191 (1997) [hereinafter Chaos].
47. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 313.
48. See id. For a more comprehensive overview of the history of West Publishing
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By the mid-twentieth century, West Publishing had vastly expanded its
print offerings, producing many of the core materials associated with the
modern legal publishing industry. West became entrenched as the leading
commercial producer of the full array of primary and secondary print legal
resources on the market, including the United States Code Annotated, the
federal and state West Reporters, the West Digests (with the attendant
headnotes schema), the Corpus Juris Secundum legal encyclopedia,
Thus, the so-called print story of
practice books, and so on.49
contemporary legal research resources has its firm genesis with the West
Publishing Company.
The print story of the legal publishing industry also involves the early
competitors to West Publishing. A significant example is the Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Company, West’s first substantial rival.50 Unlike
West Publishing, the Lawyers Cooperative deployed a more selective
publishing strategy, disseminating only a limited number of decisions in
conjunction with its Total Client-Service Library (i.e., an integrated system
of legal reference works).51 The Lawyers Cooperative also published the
American Jurisprudence legal encyclopedia (in answer to West’s Corpus
Juris encyclopedia) and the United States Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers’
Edition, among other notable titles still in print today.52
Other salient examples of early West competitors abound. The Michie
Company, established in the late nineteenth century, published a wide
range of print legal materials, such as the United States Code Service and
various state legislative codes.53 The Shepard’s Company produced the
pioneering and now-ubiquitous citator service, a product allowing
practitioners to determine the validity of found legal authority.54 Final
examples of still-relevant historic publishers include Anderson Publishing,
the Matthew Bender and Company, Callaghan and Company, and the
Bureau of National Affairs, all of which emerged as prominent producers
see, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S, 132-33 (1983); Ross E. Davies, How West Law Was Made: The
Company, Its Products, and Its Promotions, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 231, 232-44
(2012); Robert C. Berring, Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing into the
Future, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 29-37 (1986).
49. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in A Closed Universe: Lexis,
Westlaw, Law Schools, and the Legal Information Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
797, 822 (2006).
50. See id. at 822.
51. See KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER’S GUIDE &
REFERENCE MANUAL 8 (2014) [hereinafter LEGAL INFORMATION].
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
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of specialized treatises, looseleafs, and related analytical resources.55
The legal publishing industry in the latter half of the twentieth century
has been marked by the ascendance of three transnational firms: Thomson
Reuters, Reed-Elsevier, and Wolters Kluwer.56 The relaxation of antitrust
laws in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the formerly diverse legal
publishing market to rapidly transition towards oligopolistic
consolidation.57 Perhaps most notably, in 1996, the Canadian-based
Thomson Corporation acquired the West Publishing Company—proceeded
by Thomson’s acquisition of Reuters a decade later, resulting in the rise of
the now-dominant Thomson Reuters Corporation.58 Throughout the 1990s,
Thomson Reuters also acquired dozens of additional publishers (e.g., the
Lawyers Cooperative, Callaghan and Company, etc.), folding each within
its corporate umbrella.59
In a similar fashion, a handful of competing transnational firms have
acquired, leased, neutralized, or otherwise eliminated most third parties in
the legal publishing market. Significantly, the English-Dutch publishing
conglomerate Reed-Elsevier acquired LexisNexis, the Michie Company,
and the Shepard’s Company in the mid-to-late 1990s, thus emerging as the
contemporary rival to Thomson Reuters.60 Likewise, Wolters Kluwer, a
Dutch-based corporation, acquired such publishers as the Commerce
Clearing House (CCH), Wiley Law Publications, and Aspen Publishers,
Inc., and now occupies a second-tier position behind Thomson Reuters and
Reed-Elsevier.61 In more recent years, Bloomberg L.P. acquired the
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), propelling Bloomberg L.P. to a market
sphere approaching that of the previously unrivaled legal publishing
triumvirate.62
Much of the prior three decades has been defined by a veritable
explosion of primary, secondary, and related legal information resources,
most of which were consolidated and eventually, developed by the few
ascendant global legal publishers.63 In the information commerce context,
55. See id.
56. See Gallacher, supra note 14, at 51.
57. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 821 (“The organization of the legal information

industry more generally has certain oligopolistic characteristics, including industry
concentration and interdependence among several firms in which members have at
times adopted intensely competitive behavior.”).
58. See Chaos, supra note 46, at 198; LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 9.
59. See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 8.
60. See id. at 9.
61. See id. at 8-9.
62. See id. at 14.
63. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 825.
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in which legal resources are indeed prized commodities, this legal
publishing saga, played out on a global, multibillion-dollar scale, is an
example of deregulated, post-industrial late capitalism in its most potent
form.64 As is discussed in Part II of this Article, the homogenizing
influence of contemporary legal resources, as produced by the legal
publishing triumvirate, is a central concern of the critical research
analysis.65
B. Transition to Online Legal Resources
Since the latter portion of the twentieth century, legal research, in both
the academic and commercial markets, has transitioned from a print-based
enterprise to one dependent primarily on the use of the legal research
databases of Westlaw, LexisNexis, Bloomberg Law, and the growing
contingent of commercial and non-commercial online alternatives.66 The
legal publishing industry has been the principal player in this transition
period, earning historic high profit margins while putting forth evolving
lines of online legal products and services.67
The transition to online legal resources began some forty years ago. By
the late 1970s, both West Publishing and Mead Data Central (the originator
of LexisNexis) had introduced the first incarnations of electronic legal
research terminals, constituting the birth of Westlaw and LexisNexis, as
such.68 The last three decades have been marked by the steady advance of
the various computer-assisted legal research products as put forth by the
competing corporations (e.g., CD-ROM-based products, the Internet-based
Westlaw and LexisNexis “classic,” WestlawNext and Lexis Advance,
Bloomberg Law, etc.) and a corresponding decrease in the use—if not yet
64. See Kendall F. Svengalis, Globalisation and Commercial Legal Publishing, in
THE IALL INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LEGAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 243-45
(Richard A. Danner & Jules Winterton eds., 2012) [hereinafter Globalisation]
(detailing the rise of the transnational legal publishing oligopoly and its problematic
market aspects).
65. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 401.
66. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, 2013 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT (Joshua Poje ed., 2013) [hereinafter 2013 SURVEY];
Laura K. Justiss, A Survey of Electronic Research Alternatives to LexisNexis and
Westlaw in Law Firms, 103 L. LIBR. J. 71, 73-74 (2011).
67. See Globalisation, supra note 64, at 244.
68. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 816; see also William G. Harrington, A Brief
History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 L. LIBR. J. 543, 544 (1985) (“By the
early 1960s, there was much talk in the legal profession about the geometric rate of
increase in [legal information] . . . . What about those huge, mysterious, and
temperamental machines, computers? Could they somehow be programmed to do
some of the work of legal research?”).
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the production—of print legal resources.69 The utilization of print legal
materials certainly persists, but the most recent surveys (and the
overwhelming evidence apparent to any casual observer) indicate that the
vast majority of contemporary researchers increasingly rely on online legal
research resources.70 Online legal research has become the status quo in
the industry, whereas print legal research has waned.71
The premier legal research databases of WestlawNext, Lexis Advance,
and Bloomberg Law are not mere amalgamations of digitized legal
resources.72 Such high-end legal databases contain a range of integrated
products, services, and software tools, including legal content
(supplemented by news, market, and industry analytical materials),
proprietary search protocols (or search algorithms) paired with online
indexing systems, and online citator services that now provide diversified
Therefore, the major legal
functionality, among other features.73
publishers, through these premier databases, now offer integrated platforms
that constitute more than mere digital warehouses of traditional legal
content.
In more recent years, alternatives to the high-end legal research
databases also have emerged and taken root among practitioners.74 The
first category of such resources consists of alternative legal research
resources per se, such as the commercial (but low cost) legal databases of
Loislaw and Fastcase.75 Also included in this category are freely available
online legal resources such as the well-regarded Cornell Legal Information
Institute and governmental websites like GPO FDsys.76 These free and low
cost alternatives are steeply pared down versions of Westlaw and Lexis, in
providing only unannotated primary sources, limited or no secondary
resources, and rudimentary software services and tools (e.g., such resources
69. See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 3.
70. See Kristen E. Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: Information Literacy As the

New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117, 125 (2012) (“The 2011
ABA Legal Technology Survey shows that 98% of the respondents conduct legal
research online, a number that has grown each year of the survey . . . . While print
materials have not been abandoned altogether, it is clear that they are used less
frequently”); Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research Training: Preparing Students for
A Rapidly Changing Research Environment, 13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING
INST. 241, 242 (2007).
71. See Murray, supra note 70, at 125.
72. See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 4; Chaos, supra note 46, at 19799.
73. See Murray, supra note 70, at 125.
74. See Justiss, supra note 66, at 84-85.
75. See id. at 75-76.
76. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 836-38.
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lack citator services and advanced search algorithms).77
A second category consists of free, online repositories of legal
periodicals. Notable examples are the Social Science Research Network
(SSRN) and the Bepress Law Review Commons, which collectively make
available tens of thousands of law review articles.78 As the name suggests,
SSRN houses scholarship not just in the legal field, but also across all
disciplines encompassed by the social sciences; the greater Digital
Commons performs an analogous function.79 Such online legal scholarship
repositories have been a boon for practitioners and scholars alike because
online repositories often contain cutting edge scholarship not yet available
in the standard legal databases,80 and because law review articles posted in
such repositories constitute freely available secondary resources for the
practitioner.81
A third category is an online catch-all: any free Internet resources not
covered in the two categories above. Legal researchers increasingly rely on
the Internet at large in conducting legal research (i.e., Internet resources
that are not legal-specific) through search engines such as Google, usergenerated resources like Wikipedia, and so on.82 Indeed, a recent ABA
77. Id. See Greg Lambert, Casemaker Unique Among Legal Research Providers,
89 MICH. B.J., 54, 54-56 (2010); Nick Farris, Free and Reduced Cost Legal Research
Options for Minnesota Lawyers, MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N (April 22, 2015, 8:12 PM),
http://mnbenchbar.com/?s=free+and+reduced+cost+legal+research&cat=0.
78. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 811-12. Legal repositories are representative of
the broader open access movement. See James M. Donovan & Carol A. Watson,
Citation Advantage of Open Access Legal Scholarship, 103 L. LIBR. J. 553, 557 (2011)
(“In its most elemental form, open access can be defined as providing free access for all
Internet users to materials that have traditionally been published in scholarly
journals.”); Joseph S. Miller, Forward: Why Open Access to Scholarship Matters, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 733, 733-35 (2006); see also JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS
PRINCIPLE 5 (2006) (“[A] commitment to the value and quality of research carries with
it a responsibility to extend the circulation of this work as far as possible, and ideally to
all who are interested in it and all who might profit by it.”). Free online access to
primary legal authority also is crucial in contemporary democracies—one thinks of Lon
Fuller’s procedural requirement to “publicize, or at least to make available to the
affected party, the rules he is expected to observe.” LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969). But see Benjamin R. Dryden, Technological Leaps and
Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 836
(2008) ([W]e are merely witnessing the infancy of free legal research on the Internet. It
is hardly an overstatement to predict that an age of regular judicial citation to Internet
resources . . . is just around the corner.”).
79. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 811-12.
80. See Ian Ramsay, SSRN and Law Journals—Rivals or Allies?, 40 INT’L J.
LEGAL INFO. 134, 141 (2012).
81. See id. at 135.
82. See Jootaek Lee, Gatekeepers of Legal Information: Evaluating and
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survey indicates that thirty-seven percent of all contemporary attorneys
now begin the legal research process with general Internet searching.83
Thus, in addition to the high-end legal databases, both commercial and
non-commercial online resources have become standardized within the
profession.
C. Print and Online Legal Research Compared
Much remains controversial in the rich and varied discourse pertaining to
the transition from print to online legal research.84 However, a largely
uncontroversial divergence between print and online legal research, as
commonly understood, hinges not on the substance of the resources—nor
even necessarily on the nature of the legal research process itself—but
rather, on the functionality of the research tools, or finding aids, associated
with the two mediums.85 This divergent functionality,86 alternatively
Integrating Free Internet Legal Resources into the Classroom, 17 BARRY L. REV. 221,
224 (2012).
83. See 10 Technology Trends Shaping the Legal Industry, YOUR ABA (May 19,
2014),
http://www.a
mericanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2014/05/10_technology_trends.html (citing 2013 SURVEY, supra note 66);
Ruth S. Stevens, Using Google for Legal Research, 93 Mich. BUS. L.J. 56, 56 (2014)
(“[A]s more high-quality resources become available for free on the web, Google, with
its advanced search capabilities, becomes a useful and cost-effective tool for
conducting legal research.”).
84. See generally Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 223, 226 (2008); Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari—Why Competent
Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 85-86 (2007); Paul
Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of
California Supreme Court Opinions, 97 L. LIBR. J. 285, 285 (2005); Lee F. Peoples,
The Death of the Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What Is the Modern
Legal Researcher to Do?, 97 L. LIBR. J. 661, 665 (2005); Allan Hanson, From Key
Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 L. LIBR. J. 563,
589–92 (2002); Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer
Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 L. LIBR. J. 285, 287 (2001); Robert C. Berring, Legal
Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1703-04
(2000) [hereinafter Cognitive Authority]; ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 45-46 (1998); Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and
the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 85-86 (1998); Frederick
Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 1080, 1082-83 (1997); Robert C. Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby:
Planning the Future of Legal Information, 83 CAL. L. REV. 615, 635 (1995); Peter C.
Schanck, Taking Up Barkan’s Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal
Research, 82 L. LIBR. J. 1, 22 (1990).
85. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 241-42.
86. The term “functionality” is associated with online resources almost exclusively
and can be defined as how a program or software tool (literally) functions or works for
the user. See, e.g., A.H. Rajani, Davidson & Associates v. Jung: (Re)interpreting
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termed the “mechanical difference” in accessing the competing mediums,87
is in essence the what and the how of locating legal information.
The implications of this divergence may make all the difference. An
important aspect of the critical project involves determining which varieties
of tools and functionality best succeed in allowing the researcher to
produce novel research results, often in the form of new or synthesized
progressive remedies.88 In fact, as will be discussed, leading critical
commentators posit that traditional research methodologies for both print
and online mediums fail to adequately spur genuine legal innovation,
despite the supposed advantages of computer-assisted legal research in
particular.89 Nevertheless, the basic mechanics of two mediums are
covered here, in a preliminary sense, in order to provide a functional
framework for the subsequent sections in this Article.
1. Print Resources
Although now in its twilight period, the vastly influential West Digest
system is the preeminent tool for print case law research.90 The West
classification system for the Digests, comprised entirely of editorially
prepared case law headnotes, functions via a massive taxonomic scheme
known as the West Topic and Key Number system. 91 In this taxonomic
scheme, West editors have divided all areas of American case law into over
four hundred macro legal categories such as Criminal Law, Fraud,
Property, etc.92 These macro categories constitute the “topics.” Then,
within each of the topics, the West editors have further devised thousands
of micro categories, or “key numbers,” which in turn cover sub-areas of
law within each topic.93 For example, sub-areas within the Fraud topic, as
selected by West, include False or Deceptive Advertising and Fraud on
Government, each of which are assigned respective key numbers.94 West
Access Controls, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 374 (2006). But for convenience’s
sake—and because the cross-usage seems etymologically sound—”functionality” here
is used in the context of print resources as well (i.e., how a print resource mechanically
functions for the researcher).
87. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 227-28.
88. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 308-09.
89. See id.
90. See Hanson, supra note 84, at 569.
91. See id. at 568-69.
92. WESTLAW NEXT, SEARCHING WITH TOPIC AND KEY NUMBERS 5-8
(2013) available at http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/kns-quick-ref-guide-l361255.pdf [hereinafter Key Number System].
93. See id.
94. See id.
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editors may further divide these key numbers into ever-more specific subcategories, assigning additional key numbers accordingly.
In terms of the overall editorial process, the discrete points of law from
state and federal judicial opinions, as published in the West Reporters, are
classified in the Topic and Key Number system and organized within the
state, regional, federal, and national West Digests. After a judicial opinion
is handed down, West editors extract what they deem to be the individual
points of law from the case.95 These points of law become headnotes that
oftentimes are restated in the editors’ own words.96 The guiding principle
behind the system is that West assigns identical topics and key numbers to
headnotes that express synonymous legal concepts, regardless of
jurisdiction—this practice then allows researchers to locate all on-point
mandatory and persuasive judicial authority for a specific issue.97 As West
determines that the courts have adopted new legal concepts, so too are new
topics and key numbers eventually generated for the system. At present,
there are over one hundred thousand key numbers, each of which
represents, in West’s estimation, a unique point of American case law.98
As for the functionality of these print West systems, researchers locate
opinions by subject matter via the classification scheme. To retrieve
relevant cases, researchers rely on West Digest subject indexes, wherein
West editors list key terms alphabetically and assign relevant topics and
key numbers to those terms.99 Researchers then use the found topics and
key numbers to peruse headnotes in the appropriate West Digests, and from
Digest citations, researchers finally move to the relevant cases in the West
Reporters.100
The remaining print resources use more streamlined research tools. For
statutes, regulations, and core secondary resources (e.g., legal
encyclopedias, the American Law Reports, etc.), common starting points
include either an editorially prepared subject index or tables of popular
names and laws.101 Like with West Digest subject indexes, researchers
move from on-point index selections to the corresponding statute or

95. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 289.
96. See id.; Susan Nevelow Mart, The Relevance of Results Generated by Human

Indexing and Computer Algorithms: A Study of West’s Headnotes and Key Numbers
and LexisNexis’s Headnotes and Topics, 102 L.LIBR. J. 221, 223 (2010).
97. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 290.
98. See generally Key Number System, supra note 92, at 5-8.
99. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 291-92.
100. See id. at 291.
101. William A. Hilyerd, Using the Law Library: A Guide for Educators Part IV:
Secondary Sources to the Rescue, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 273, 274, 287 (2005).
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secondary resources entry.102 And for latter stages of the print research
process, practitioners may rely upon annotations, cross-references, and
Shepard’s citator tables—all of which, like the West Topic and Key
Number system, are subject to the editorial discretion of commercial
publishers.103
A much-touted byproduct of print legal research is “browsing,” or the
ability to somewhat serendipitously locate on-point materials through their
proximate location to the researcher’s actual, found authority.104 An
example of browsing occurs when a print researcher uses a subject index to
locate a pertinent citation in a Digest, but by scanning the page, discovers a
more suitable entry above or below. Browsing also comes into play when
serendipitous discoveries are made through the use of tables of contents,
section outlines, annotations, etc., or through locating related materials via
a proximate arrangement of subject-specific monographs on shelves.105
Logically, a researcher’s success in locating relevant authority is
constricted by the accuracy of the predicted keywords, but print browsing
allows the researcher to control for—and in some ways, to transcend—the
limitations of predicted key terms. Browsing is believed to be a more
intuitive and effective strategy via print legal research as compared to
online browsing equivalents.106
2. Online Resources
Since the mid-1990s, Internet-based, commercial legal databases (e.g.,
Westlaw and Lexis) have captured the market.107 As discussed above,
these high-end databases integrate legal content with niche analytical
materials and sophisticated software services.108 However, the text of the
102. See id. at 279–80.
103. See Paul D. Callister, The “Science” of Citation Analysis?, 91 ILL. B.J. 473,

473-74 (2003).
104. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 244; see also RONALD E. RICE ET AL., ACCESSING
AND BROWSING INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 174 (2001) (“Browsing is a
specific subject for research in the library literature and can be traced back to the
Project Intrex in the mid-1960s, when experiments on browsing were suggested . . . to
[explore how the technique may] foster unplanned discovery”).
105. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 244.
106. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320-21.
107. Cognitive Authority, supra note 84, at 1701-03; see also Lynn Foster & Bruce
Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal Research, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
275, 281-82 (2000) (“During the 1990s, the invention and development of the World
Wide Web . . . became another electronic medium for legal publishing. LOIS, LEXIS,
and Westlaw moved to the Web, accompanied by most print legal publishers.”).
108. See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 4. The average commercial
subscription to premier legal databases (e.g., for small- to medium-sized firms) likely
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core legal content on these databases has remained fundamentally
unchanged.109 That is, despite the obvious differences in the medium of
print and online legal products, the actual texts of core online resources are
digital duplicates of the texts from print analogs.110
To qualify this assertion, a preliminary caveat can be added. To the
extent to which the transition to online resources has altered the
presumably shared epistemological state of legal researchers (i.e., how
researchers intellectually process and thus “know” legal texts111), this shift
has been of little benefit, in terms of practical research outcomes, to critical
law reform efforts.112 Indeed, as is discussed in Part II, the transition to the
online medium in fact has likely degraded such a shared research state,113
excludes the newer varieties of niche analytical content like market and industry
reports. Off-the-record comments by legal publishing representatives support this
assertion—but confirmatory statistics are pointedly not made available; a concrete
definition of an “average” commercial subscription to Westlaw or Lexis then is
somewhat elusive. Telephone interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney, Thomson
Reuters (Oct. 6, 2014); telephone interview with Lexis Advance Reference Attorney,
Reed-Elsevier (Oct. 6, 2014); Ian Gallacher, Forty-Two: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to
Teaching Legal Research to the Google Generation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 151, 196
(2006) (“Costs for these services are difficult to determine because of the variety of
pricing packages offered by legal information publishers.”); see also Justiss, supra note
66, at 83 (demonstrating that the 2008 financial crisis has incentivized firms to cut back
on research resources and to otherwise pursue alternative resources).
109. Core legal content denotes the primary authority and the classic canon of
secondary resources (e.g., legal encyclopedias, treatises, law review articles, etc.) as
variously made available in average commercial subscriptions to the premier legal
databases.
110. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 228 (“[T]he content of the law is largely
unchanged, regardless of whether a researcher finds a hard copy of a case in a reporter
volume after using a print digest or reviews it in electronic form on a computer screen
after locating it using an electronic database search.”). But in terms of core legal
content on legal databases (and in limited print resources, like the Federal Appendix)
one content addition is the availability of “unpublished as well as published cases.
These unpublished cases were completely inaccessible in the past, when they were
undisseminated and unindexed.” Foster & Kennedy, supra note 107, at 282–83
(emphasis added).
111. See id. at 229 (“Medium theory posits that the medium by which information
is communicated . . . is not neutral. Instead, it significantly shapes how the conveyed
information is understood.”). In broadly applying medium theory to legal resources,
Kuh makes the following conclusion: “This Article has sought to demonstrate that the
shift to electronic research is likely shaping the law in little-noticed, but nonetheless
significant, ways . . . . Although we presently lack data to identify the precise contours
of these impacts, this Article advocates that the academy and the profession recognize”
such developments and further investigate them. Id.
112. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 325-28.
113. See infra Part II(C) & (D). It is overly reductive to assume—as I do here—that
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in that online researchers appear to be less capable and creative than their
predecessors, to the obvious detriment of the law reform movement.
In returning to the textual duplication of print and online resource
analogs, a few examples may better illustrate this phenomenon. A
retrieved Westlaw decision from the Southeastern Reporter is textually
indistinguishable from the decision published in the corresponding print
volume. The same holds true for statutes, administrative regulations,
municipal ordinances, or any other conceivable primary resource. The
evolving canon of secondary resources, such as Restatements of the Law,
practice books, treatises, legal encyclopedias, law review articles, and
looseleafs have remained fundamentally unchanged in terms of core textual
content following the transition to the online medium.114 Finally, the text
of West headnotes and the West Topic and Key Number system is also
duplicated and deployed in an enhanced fashion in the specific context of
the WestlawNext database.115
This seemingly self-evident observation is important, in a foundational
sense, from the critical perspective, wherein the perceived benefits of
online legal research are systematically unveiled as either largely inflated
or completely erroneous.116 In sum, the core world of textual legal content
available to the researcher on WestlawNext and Lexis Advance is not
materially different from the legal content relied upon by practitioners in
the past.117 With this foundation in place, the focus now can shift towards
the more practical mechanics of online legal research.
Although rarely recognized as such, high-end legal databases in fact rely
on most of the paradigmatic, commercial research tools associated with the
print legal medium, albeit in enhanced, online formats, including the West
Topic and Key Number system, annotations, editorially selected crossreferences, and citator services.118
As an online legal-conceptual organizational system, the West Topic and
Key Number system continues to perform its age-old function on
WestlawNext in classifying all points of case law.119 Online citator
services (e.g., West’s KeyCite, Shepard’s on Lexis, etc.) also are integrated
a truly universalized print or online research “state” exists for all attorneys. This
simplified characterization is used for expediency’s sake, but a future, more subtle
unpacking is required in the literature.
114. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 228.
115. See Mart, supra note 96, at 229; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.
116. See infra Part II(C).
117. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 228.
118. See Mart, supra note 96, at 229; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368; Wolf &
Wishart, supra note 23, at 24-25.
119. See Mart, supra note 96, at 225-27.
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on the commercial databases.120 Online citators still function to update the
law, but while the print Shepard’s service operated exclusively to confirm
the validity of judicial opinions, online citator systems now offer a far more
diversified functionality in allowing researchers to locate a full array of
citing primary and secondary authorities as selected by the publishers.121
The definitive functionality driving online research is keyword
searching.122 Although contemporary database researchers may make use
of digitized subject indexes (i.e., for limited resources such as annotated
codes), and although, as discussed below, online “browsing” is at least
somewhat comparable to the print browsing experience,123 keywords are
indeed the defining search functionality in the online medium. For a
keyword search, the practitioner formulates words or phrases similar to the
initial predicted key terms that are generated and thereafter applied to a
subject index for print research.124 The researcher then types those terms
into an online legal database, and the system’s search algorithm, in most
instances, returns results based on a relevancy calculation. Factors
considered in relevancy calculations traditionally include frequency and
proximity of keywords in the searched documents, citation counts, and
pertinent document metadata such as title, author, etc.125
120. See Wolf & Wishart, supra note 23, at 24-25.
121. See id. at 25 (“Citation services perform a number of important tasks for a

specified case, such as checking its subsequent history and finding later citing cases
and secondary sources.”); Wheeler, supra note 22, at 372 (“KeyCite is designed to give
you both analysis and links to all of the documents that cite to your original
authority . . . . A recent study that compared results [from] KeyCite and Shepard’s
revealed not only that the two systems yield different results, but also that both systems
yield incomplete results.”).
122. See Hanson, supra note 84, at 564.
123. See Thomas Keefe, Books in Space—Online Versions of Print Publications If
the “New” Realm of Electronic Legal Research Is Foreign Territory, Take Heart. Your
Familiar Print Resources Are Probably Online, Where They’re More Powerful Than
Ever, 93 ILL. B.J. 42, 43 (2005).
124. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310.
125. See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 294-95; see, e.g., James F. Bauerle,
Fighting Fire with Fire: Technology As Antidote to Excessive Subprime Lending, 124
BANKING L.J. 714, 722 (2007) (“[T]he credit reporting industry offers no publicly
available resource that explains the credit scoring algorithms used to determine
consumer scores. Nor is there any legal requirement that credit reporting agencies
disclose their rating methodology or validate its accuracy before a neutral body.”); see
also Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY
L.J. 507, 535 (2005) (“Regardless of which relevancy algorithms search engines use,
their importance to [online searching] cannot be overstated. As a practical matter,
relevancy algorithms determine the results that searchers see and investigate. Searchers
do not generally look at search results beyond the first page or two . . . .”). Proprietary
algorithms are demonstrably problematic in other contexts as well.
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While the basic relevancy factors remain largely unchanged on Lexis
Advance and Bloomberg Law, the WestSearch algorithm on WestlawNext
deploys new factors. Significantly, the West Topic and Key Number
system provides automated input on all WestlawNext relevancy
calculations—and thus on all WestlawNext keyword searches.126 Similarly,
the WestSearch algorithm receives input from the KeyCite citator service
and select West secondary resources.127 Because the Topic and Key
Number system in particular performed a more peripheral role in earlier
incarnations of Westlaw databases,128 this is indeed an historic
enhancement.
In detailing the key role that the West Topic and Key Number system
and KeyCite now perform in WestSearch, Ronald Wheeler reports:
“WestSearch really is revolutionary . . . I have not yet discovered an
instance where relevant and important cases that share a particular topic
and key number fail to display within a search result designed to retrieve
the issue covered by said topic and key number.”129 If so desired, a
researcher retains the ability to search within an interactive version of the
Topic and Key Number system, or to use topics and key numbers in
“found” cases to find cases similarly categorized.130 However, as Wheeler
demonstrates, every search on WestlawNext now depends on the automated
input of the West Topic and Key Number system, regardless of the
choice—or even the knowledge—of the researcher.131
Yet another groundbreaking addition in WestSearch relevancy
calculations is the integration of crowdsourcing. In the legal database
context, crowdsourcing essentially harnesses the collective expertise of
West-selected users.132 Through crowdsourcing attributes, WestSearch
analyzes the pertinent research patterns of commercial (i.e., non-academic)
users deemed expert, and factors those patterns into relevancy
calculations.133 For example, if WestSearch determines that commercial
users view, save, folder, or print certain legal documents based on selected
keywords, the expert user-targeted documents thereafter are ranked higher
in the relevancy results when future researchers use synonymous

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.
Id. at 360-61.
See Kuh, supra note 84, at 246-47.
Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.
Robert A. Mead, A Eulogy for New Mexico Reports: The Evolution of
Appellate Publication from 1846 to 2012, 42 N.M. L. REV. 417, 457 (2012).
131. See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 369.
132. See id. at 365.
133. See id.
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keywords.134 Similar to the inclusion of the West Topic and Key Number
system, the end result of the crowdsourcing enhancement is that every
search performed on WestlawNext now depends on the automated input of
West-selected users.
Keyword searching may be further divided into two categories: (1)
Boolean operator searching, and (2) natural language searching.135 As for
Boolean operators (known alternatively as terms and connectors), the
researcher generates a syntactical calculus that dictates to the system, at
least to a degree, what results are to be returned.136 For example, the
Boolean search “mountaintop removal” w/s “valley fill” asks the system to
retrieve documents that contain the exact phrase “mountaintop removal”
within the same sentence as “valley fill.”137 Natural language searching
eschews a syntactical calculus, instead relying on plain, Google-like search
phrases that are processed according to the search algorithm’s dictates.138
The following constitutes a natural language search: valley fill from
mountain top removal operations.
Agency on the part of the researcher traditionally has been maximized
through the command-like control of syntactical calculi.139 However,
commentators are uncertain whether the newest generation of legal search
algorithms, like WestSearch, fully obeys the commands of Boolean
operators because “a WestlawNext Boolean search is still subject to
WestSearch and its incorporation of key numbers.”140 Therefore, the onceclear distinction between Boolean operators and natural language has
blurred due to the WestSearch algorithm enhancements.
D. Traditional Legal Research Process
The paradigmatic print legal research process can be said to proceed in

134. See id.
135. See Keefe, supra note 123, at 42.
136. See Symposium, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the

Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery August 2007 Public
Comment Version, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 222 (2007).
137. See Keefe, supra note 123, at 42; Jason R. Baron, Toward A Federal
Benchmarking Standard for Evaluating Information Retrieval Products Used in EDiscovery, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 237, 240 (2005).
138. Ian Gallacher, Cite Unseen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools
Can Cure Our Strange Devotion to Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of
Open and Equal Access to the Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 491, 511 (2007) (“Both
LexisNexis and Westlaw have also introduced ‘natural language’ search engines that
do not require the researcher to determine the relational context of the key terms.”).
139. See Keefe, supra note 123, at 42.
140. Wheeler, supra note 22, at 370.
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four steps. The first step in a fact-based legal research query is to examine
the presented facts and to predict which legal categories likely control those
facts, known historically as the search for the ratio decidendi, or the law
determining the case.141 In the second step, a researcher formulates key
terms based on the pertinent facts paired with the predicted, controlling
legal categories.142 For the classic research process, an attorney unfamiliar
with the predicted topical area then might apply the formulated key terms
to (1) the West Topic and Key Number system, or (2) the commercial
canon of secondary resources, so as to acquire background information on
the topic.143 Alternatively, a researcher comfortable with the area may
begin the process with known primary authorities such as specific statutory
sections within an annotated code.144 Third, from these starting points,
researchers may then modify the scope of the query through alternate
keywords, annotations, cross-references, etc.145 Fourth, the researcher
updates found authority via the Shepard’s citator service.146 Locating
primary mandatory authority and primary persuasive authority, as required
is commonly understood to be the terminal objective of the classic legal
research process.
The transition to the online medium has precipitated a variation on the
traditional research process. In theory, an online researcher may begin the
research process by keyword searching within secondary resources, as
available in each database. Through WestlawNext, a researcher even may
perform a search within the online West Topic and Key Number system.
However, studies indicate that online researchers tend to eschew these
techniques, instead initiating the research process by performing keyword
searches within targeted primary sources (e.g., a case law sub-database),147
or else by keyword searching across the entirety of a database’s resources
simultaneously.148 Thereafter, online researchers negotiate the results
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Barkan, supra note 3, at 622.
See id. at 623-24.
See id. at 624.
See id.
Richard A. Danner, Legal Information and the Development of American Law:
Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law, 99 L. LIBR. J. 193, 213
(2007).
146. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 242.
147. See Stefan H. Krieger & Katrina Fischer Kuh, Accessing Law: An Empirical
Study Exploring the Influence of Legal Research Medium, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
757, 789 (2014).
148. Robert J. Ambrogi, Westlaw’s Great Leap Forward More Than A Makeover,
70 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 15 (2010) (explaining that the WestlawNext main page
resembles Google in encouraging the user to conduct a search without first selecting a
sub-database).
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pages (directing attention to case law, especially),149 before updating found
primary authority via online citator services.
E. Legal Research Process Viewed as Normatively Neutral
Regardless of such variations, the legal research process has historically
been viewed and taught as a normatively neutral enterprise.150 Legal
research commonly is understood to be something of a positivistic science,
devoid of any political or ideological influences.151 Tellingly, in such
seminal legal research textbooks as How to Find the Law and
Fundamentals of Legal Research (and in the newer generation of such
textbooks) authors “present legal research as a search for ‘authority’ or the
‘the law’ that determines the result of a particular legal problem.”152 Legal
research textbooks then “reflect a tendency to talk about law as preexisting
and given . . . something that can be found.”153
The dominant, historical view is that legal research is mechanical. Each
legal query is perceived as an input that can be entered into commercial
legal resources via predicted keywords. Thereafter, the legal research
resources return an output—the accompanying “one right answer” to the
query—in the form of binding precedent, the “correct” ratio decidendi.154
When Arthur Langdell spoke of the library as a laboratory of law, this then
was his meaning: that legal research is an objective science wherein
correct, binding law is discovered.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 789.
See Barkan, supra note 3, at 619-21.
See id.
Id. (quoting J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
RESEARCH 9 (1987)); AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND
STRATEGIES 303-05 (5th ed., 2009); Peggy Copper Davis, Casebooks, Learning
Theory, and the Need to Manage Uncertainty, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 230, 239 (Edward Rubin ed., 2012) (“Few among us speak clearly or coherently to
our students about indeterminacy, and many of us postpone the discussion until
students have been entrapped by illusions of certainty.”). But see Sarah Valentine,
Leveraging Legal Research, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE
LAW TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 145, 158 (Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden
Gate Univ. Sen. of Law eds., 2011) (“Restructuring legal research around a public
interest framework allows schools to leverage an overlooked course into one that
actively nourishes students’ social justice aspirations during the first year of law
school.”).
153. See Barkan, supra note 3, at 620.
154. David Wolitz, Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism, and Tragic Cases, 62 BUFF. L.
REV. 529, 578 (2014) (“Those who deny legal indeterminacy, such as Dworkin, usually
argue that because the law rationally determines one right answer, the judge’s duty is to
reason to that uniquely correct answer.”).
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III. CRITICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
A. Critical Legal Research Theory
The very notion of a critical approach to the legal research process is
grounded in the decades-old school —or collective movement —known as
critical legal theory.155 As opposed to a discrete framework, contemporary
critical legal theory perhaps is best defined as a diverse and inclusive canon
of “literature or ideas,”156 including such schools as feminist legal theory,
critical race theory, critical race feminism, LatCrit, queer legal theory,
disability theory, law and socioeconomics, and critical examinations of
environmental law157—the theoretical underpinnings of which were
influenced by such foundational movements as legal realism, neo-Marxism,
post-structuralism, and deconstruction.158 As a unifying force, modern
critical legal theory arguably offers a “radical, left-oriented critique of
contemporary law and jurisprudence,”159 based on the normative premise
that “social class stratification and hierarchical power distributions, as they
exist in our society, are inherently unjust.”160 Critical legal theory tends to
have a liberatory agenda; thus, the overarching aim is to pursue “‘human
155. Id. at 578.
156. RICHARD W. BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY IN THE FIRST WAVE OF

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 175l (2002).
157. See Victoria Ortiz & Jennifer Elrod, Construction Project: Color Me Queer, in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 258-67 (2011)
[hereinafter Construction]; Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning
in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REV. 61, 71 (2010); see also Nick J. Sciullo,
“This Woman’s Work” in A “Man’s World”: A Feminist Analysis of the Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 709, 723 (2006) (“Postcolonial
theory and feminist theory share several important intersections. Both often reject
nationalist structures. Both often reject masculinized structures. Often, both also seek to
resist various forms of oppression and restore some sense of freedom to individuals.
These connections provide ample room for the theories to develop together . . . .”);
Karen Morrow, Not So Much A Meeting of Minds As A Coincidence of Means:
Ecofeminism, Gender Mainstreaming, and the United Nations, 28 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 185, 188-94 (2005) (discussing ecofeminism in the context of international
human rights).
158. See, e.g., Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of
Environmental Law: A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005, 1027
(2013); Nick J. Sciullo, A Whale of A Tale: Post-Colonialism, Critical Theory, and
Deconstruction: Revisiting the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
Through A Socio-legal Perspective, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 29, 42 (2008); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, LatCrit Theory: Some Preliminary Notes Towards A Transatlantic Dialogue,
9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A
Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 947 (1992).
159. Barkan, supra note 3, at 618.
160. Rubinson, supra note 157, at 947.
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emancipation’ in circumstances of domination and oppression,”161 and to
generally promote democratic and egalitarian principles.162
1. Doctrinal Incoherency and Indeterminacy
The first wave of critical legal theorists introduced a range of interrelated
notions that sparked the genesis of critical work on the institution of legal
research specifically.163 The following are principles associated with the
pioneering literature of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement per se
(active in the 1970s and 1980s).
First, legal doctrine is “incoherent and indeterminate,” as opposed to
being formalistic, or a science, because any given body of precedent—, no
matter how comprehensive—, is incapable of covering all conceivable fact
situations.164
More specifically, an application of the tenets of
deconstruction to legal texts yields the conclusion that all doctrine is open
to innumerable interpretations, and that thus no discrete body of precedent
can constrain judicial decisions.165
Second, legal reasoning largely is a myth. There exists no neutral mode
of rationality through which “correct” law is discovered and applied
through stare decisis.166 Instead, the enterprise is driven predominantly by
political and ideological considerations—which largely reflect the
dominant liberal-capitalist worldview.167
Third, and finally, all categorizations of law are inherently subjective.
Moreover, like the myth of legal reasoning, such categorizations serve the
dominant, homogenous interests of society at the expense of subordinated
groups. Taken as a whole then, these three principles demonstrate “the
161. Caroline Bettinger-Lopez et. al., Redefining Human Rights Lawyering Through
the Lens of Critical Theory: Lessons for Pedagogy and Practice, 18 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 337, 348 (2011) (quoting James Bohman, Critical Theory, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/).
162. See Barkan, supra note 3, at 618.
163. See id. But see Construction, supra note 157, at 262 (“What is often missing
from CLS works is the acknowledgment that our experiences of the same
circumstances may be very, very different . . . . CLS as a critique of the legal system—
without addressing the needs of the multiply diverse disempowered, without providing
concrete, practical solutions—was, like Marxism, not sufficient.”).
164. Id. at 626.
165. See id. at 627-28.
166. See id. at 629.
167. See id. at 629-31; Jason E. Whitehead, The Labor Exemption from Antitrust As
an Ideological Antinomy, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 881, 915 (1996) (“[T]he flaw with
legal reasoning is that of a very specific historical, economic, and social system:
capitalism and the liberal individualist ideology that supports it.”).
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need for radical change” in the mold of progressive thought.168
In more recent years, such early insights proffered by the CLS
movement have been qualified somewhat and refined. Mark Tushnet
explores such shifts in Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the
United States: “claims that all results were underdetermined were replaced
by [claims] that many results were underdetermined, or that results in many
interesting cases were, or . . . that enough results were underdetermined to
matter.”169 Thus, although subsequently refined, the theoretical progeny of
the core CLS tenets remain vital in the contemporary critical discourse. As
Tushnet writes, “[o]ne or another of these revised versions of the
indeterminacy argument is, I think, accepted by nearly every serious legal
scholar in the United States.”170 Contemporary critical scholars also
continue to maintain that “[t]hrough indeterminacy, the legal system allows
powerful interests to dominate outcomes, while retaining the appearance of
neutrality and autonomy.”171
As Charles Barkan argues persuasively in the seminal essay
Deconstructing Legal Research, the foundational insights proffered by the
CLS movement in addition to subsequent discourse refinements are
innately applicable to—and in fact, are inseparable from—the longstanding
institution of the American legal research process.172 As Barkan elucidates:
A CLS analysis of legal research might start with the impression that
there is something fundamentally wrong with the way modern legal
thinking responds to social problems, and that the traditional methods
and materials of legal research contribute to that unsatisfactory state of
affairs. In CLS critiques of legal doctrine, legal reasoning, and legal
173
categories, the relationships become more clear.

The unreconstructed legal research process demands that the attorney
discover the discrete precedent controlling a given fact pattern. For an
issue of first impression, the researcher must discover the ratio decidendi,
which the judge then applies formalistically to fill a gap in the common
law.174
168. Rubinson, supra note 157, at 948.
169. Mark Tushnet, Survey Article Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the

United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 105, 108 (2005).
170. Id.
171. John Hagan et. al., Collaboration and Resistance in the Punishment of Torture
in Iraq: A Judicial Sentencing Experiment, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 10 (2010).
172. See Barkan, supra note 3, at 618.
173. Id. at 625.
174. See id. at 622; Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L.
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However, critical principles reveal the sometimes impossibility, and
indeed very often the preposterousness, of this conception. For the legal
researcher, there might be no objective ratio decidendi to discover—as
indeterminacy dictates that novel fact patterns potentially could be
“controlled” by a veritable sea of competing (and oftentimes conflicting)
precedent.175 In making such selections, “a wide variety of interpretations,
distinctions, and justifications are available,” in that judges and researchers
are potentially free to choose among a plethora of competing arguments,
authorities, and so on.176 Ultimately then, law indeed is politics by another
name, and the notion of neutral, objective doctrine, devoid of the subjective
ideological preferences of judges, is mere fantasy, albeit one in service to
society’s dominant interests.177 Therefore, “the search for . . . the rule of the
case, leads nowhere.”178
2. Legal Categories
Like the critical analyses pertaining to indeterminacy and the myth of
legal reasoning, the problematic nature of legal categorizations is deeply
enmeshed in the institution of legal research.179 This insight in fact persists
as the most penetrating critique of both print and online research
mediums.180 For this reason, an extended treatment of legal categorizations
is provided here.
Due to the indeterminacy of legal doctrine, categorizations of law are
necessarily subjective social constructs—as opposed to objective
renderings of doctrinal truth.
One might wonder, how could a
categorization scheme accurately represent legal doctrine, when the critical
analysis demonstrates that doctrine is, at least partially, indeterminate? 181
REV. 509, 533 (1992) (“[T]he very notions of ‘binding precedent’ and ‘supremacy of
law’ are premised on the extraction of a ‘rule’ from a past account of legal reality (i.e.,
a past account of legally recognized facts and reasons) in order to control a future
account [sic] of legal reality.”); Barkan, supra note 3, at 628 (stating that the theory of
deconstruction conflicts with the notion that legal research is a search for a preexisting,
findable law as expressed in the writings of courts, legislatures, or agencies. If the
meanings of legal texts are created as much by researchers as by the institutions that
produce them, judicial opinions, statutes, legislative history materials, regulations, and
other resources [may be] indeterminate).
175. See Barkan, supra note 3, at 629; Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 216.
176. Barkan, supra note 3, at 626.
177. See id. at 630-32.
178. Id. at 630.
179. See id. at 631.
180. See id; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 318; Wheeler, supra note 22, at
368.
181. Barkan, supra note 3, at 626.
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As succinctly stated by Duncan Kennedy, “all such schemes are lies,” and
in fact the “very existence of historically legitimated doctrinal categories
gives the law student, the teacher, and the practitioner a false sense of the
orderliness of legal thought,” effectively masking law’s indeterminacy.182
What is more, legal categorization schemes, through their political,
historical, and economic underpinnings, reflect the normativity of the
societal status quo. Legal categories “are created and perpetuated by
society’s dominant interests,”183 in that white, patriarchal, heteronormative,
ableist, ageist, anthropocentric, atomistic-capitalist, etc. values are
reflected—and advanced—through such schemes.184 Therefore, “[legal]
classification systems can also be biased or insensitive because they may
reflect Eurocentric or other dominant ideologies and values and ignore
other cultures, races, genders, etc.,” and “[t]he end result is that
standardized categories may ultimately affect a client’s justice.”185
Jill Anne Farmer writes more on this point from a leftist, socioeconomic
perspective in A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal Research
Process.186 So states Farmer: “Because meaning is socially constructed,
the groups that control the economic and cultural apparatus of a given
society largely determine which meanings are considered most important.
Moreover, the cultural process is shaped increasingly by fewer
transnational corporations,” wherein “profit and ideological conformity”
are the controlling interests.187 To be sure, the legal publishing industry
exemplifies this phenomenon, as there exists a “unique concentration of
publishing in the hands of only a few companies.”188
Any doctrinal categorization system then is informed by and arguably is
a principal player in, our contemporary late capitalist mode. 189 Rather than
constituting objective doctrinal truth, legal categories instead embody the

182. Id. at 631 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209, 215 (1979)).
183. Id. at 632.
184. See Richard Haigh, What Shall I Wear to the Computer Revolution? Some
Thoughts on Electronic Researching in Law, 89 L. LIBR. J. 245, 261 (1997).
185. Id.
186. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 394-95.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 397.
189. See Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 251-52
(2000) (“[A] functionalist explanation of law’s organizational claims is the argument
that the traditional legal categories are an inevitable product of the relations of
production in a capitalist society; more specifically, that the traditional categories exist
to fulfill the necessary function of obscuring the exploitative nature of capitalism
behind an elegant neutral façade.”).
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subjective values characteristic of the dominant groups, interests, and
systems of modern Westernism.190
The West Topic and Key Number system, as the seminal legal
categorization scheme, is the supreme exemplar of such normative
biases.191 Commentators have agreed universally that West categories
evolve slowly: “The topic ‘Labor’ received a heading in the 1950s, and
until [the 1980s] West classified ‘Workers’ Compensation’ under ‘Master
and Servant’ law.”192 Delgado and Stefancic also have identified numerous
instances of problematic race- and sex-based categorizations in the West
system.193 Finally, one need only skim the West Topic and Key Number
outline, as it currently exists, to discern its conservative ideological bias—
e.g., that West has classified numerous same-sex marriage points of law
under the topic “Husband and Wife” is no small irony.194 Therefore,
through such doctrinal categorizations, the West Topic and Key Number
system indeed perpetuates “dominant ideologies and values” while
subordinating “other cultures, races, genders, etc.”195
But what of the practical mechanics of West’s influence vis-à-vis
doctrinal categories—and thus on research outcomes? A researcher
navigating the print West Digest system relies entirely on the Topic and
Key Number scheme.196 Predicted keywords are matched to West’s subject
index terms, and then “the digests, along with their topic and key numbers,
inexorably guide and influence the researcher’s identification of theories,
principles, and cases.”197
The argument, however, is not that West doctrinal categories expressly
“control, or cause change in, the law.”198 Through more insidious means,
West legal categories “reinforce and reify dominant ideologies, can narrow
perspectives, and can make contingent results seem inevitable.”199 For

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Haigh, supra note 184, at 261.
See id.; Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 215-20.
Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 215-16.
See, e.g., id. at 217-20.
See, e.g., Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946 (Mass. 2008).
Haigh, supra note 184, at 261.
See infra Part I(C)(1).
Kuh, supra note 84, at 244.
Spencer L. Simons, Navigating Through the Fog: Teaching Legal Research
and Writing Students to Master Indeterminacy Through Structure and Process, 56 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 356, 359 (2006).
199. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 189, at 251 (“But rather than supposing that
legal actors consciously misrepresent their motives, a functionalist explanation
supposes that legal actors are motivated and controlled by external forces. These
external forces are unacknowledged; indeed, the legal actors typically are unaware of
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instance, when attempting to classify novel fact situations, the range of
legal-doctrinal possibilities available to the researcher necessarily is
constricted by the established boundaries of West’s doctrinal categories—
when the fact situation instead may call for innovation. As stated elegantly
by Delgado and Stefancic: “[C]ategories contained in current indexing
systems are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time. They enable us to
see better, but lull us into thinking our vision is perfect and that there may
not be a still better pair.”200
West’s influence vis-à-vis the Topic and Key Number system
unsurprisingly has been characterized as a “virtual conceptual tyranny over
access.”201 Delgado and Stefancic liken the system to that of DNA, as
West’s categories “enable the current system to replicate itself endlessly,
easily, and painlessly. Their categories mirror precedent and existing law;
they both facilitate traditional legal thought and constrain novel approaches
to the law.”202 In conducting research directly through this subjective set of
West-created principles and concepts then, the West Topic and Key
Number system serves to perpetuate existing legal thought.
B. Foundations of the Critical Research Process
To achieve genuine legal innovation, the sine qua non of the critical
researcher is to “break free” of traditional doctrinal categories embodied in
the West Topic and Key Number system and elsewhere.203 In Why Do We
Tell the Same Stories: Critical Librarianship, Law Reform, and Triple
Helix Dilemma, Delgado and Stefancic put forth the seminal articulation of
how, in a macro sense, such progressive innovation is achieved.
Categories in the principal legal indexing systems are explicit. . . . If we
examine them, we will see an outline of the structure of traditional legal
thought. That structure will reveal what previous courts and writers have
recognized and what indexers have faithfully recorded. By inspecting
this record, we may gain a glimpse of the very conceptual framework we
have been wielding in scrutinizing and interpreting our societal order.
We may then inquire whether that framework is the only, or the best
means of doing so. We may turn that system on its side and ask what is

them.”). West editors, as legal actors in a very real sense, are likely similarly unaware
of the channeling effect of West’s doctrinal categories; but this lack of intent makes the
channeling effect on research outcomes no less a reality.
200. Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 209.
201. Farmer, supra note 3, at 399.
202. Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 209.
203. Id. at 217.
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204

With more force, Delgado and Stefancic later describe these sweeping
methodologies as “reinventing, modifying, flipping, and radically
transforming legal doctrines and theories imaginatively.”205
This is a tall order, for “[g]oing beyond standard legal categories” is a
daunting proposition, “even when we are going for moderate, incremental
reform.”206 A reformist-minded attorney then must take nothing as given—
law’s potential indeterminacy, after all, demands such an approach: she
must interrogate traditional legal categories, as embodied in the West
system and elsewhere, and determine how they might best be synthesized,
augmented, or otherwise transcended to effect progressive doctrinal
change.207
Delgado and Stefancic offer a concrete example of such a transformative
research approach in their early work. At that time, West provided a Topic
and Key Number category for race-based employment discrimination and a
separate category for sex-based discrimination—but not a third category
based on a synthesized race- and sex-based claim.208 As a result, when
“Black women wish[ed] to sue for job discrimination directed against them
as a Black woman,” researchers operating within the West Topic and Key
Number classifications were limited to pursuing causes of action based on
the existing race- and sex-based doctrinal categories.209 These existing
West categories were insufficient. Claims brought through each category
proved unsuccessful if the employer evinced that it had “a satisfactory
record for hiring and promoting women generally (including white women)
and similarly for hiring Blacks (including Black men).”210
To transcend these categories, attorneys articulated a novel cause of
action that synthesized the two existing categories of race- and sex-based
discrimination. Such a synthesized category was inspired in part by
intersectionality, a then-new critical notion.211 Thus, through the help of
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 223-24.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328.
Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 225.
See id. at 222–24.
See id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Intersectionality involves the proposition that “race and sex are not ‘mutually
exclusive categories of experience and analysis.’” Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and
Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J.
36, 72 (2009) (quoting Kimberlè Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory,
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critical discourse, attorneys turned the West system “on its side and ask[ed]
what is missing,” in interrogating—and then in transcending—the mutually
exclusive race- and sex-based categories that existed in the West system.212
Delgado and Stafancic put forth a number of additional examples to
illustrate the potentially transformative power of the critical approach. The
practice of “imagining new worlds” is identified as a crucial element of the
enterprise.213
Many new legal ideas come about . . . by turning a thought structure
around and asking a novel question. In race relations law, the duty to
make reparations to Latinos for stolen lands or blacks because of slavery
appeared frustrated by the simple passage of time. But what if one
imagined a world where the duty to make good for old injuries increased,
rather than decreased, over time because of interest-compounding; or one
where mixed causation and indeterminacy in the plaintiff class was
handled by prorating harms, not declaring them noncompensable? What
if one imagined a world where outsiders did not need to “cover” or
conceal the ground of their differentness, as many gays, lesbians, and
214
light-skinned minorities do?

Such examples capture the very essence of the critical research project.
Through creatively engaging with existing doctrinal categories and
theories, attorneys indeed may imagine new worlds—and then endeavor to
make such worlds a reality.
C. Critique of Online Legal Research
Since the dawn of the computer-assisted legal research era,
commentators have posited that electronic searching would free researchers
from age-old restraints, resulting in doctrinal creativity and perhaps, in law
reform.215 This widespread belief is based on such broad assertions that
and Anti-Racist Policies, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, at 139 (1989)); see Nancy Levit,
Separate Silos: Marginalizing Men in Feminist Theory and Forgetting Females in
Masculinities Studies 17 (Oct. 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law_downloads/Feminist_2010_levit.pdf
(“[F]eminists and critical race theorists have built on intersectionality ideas . . . .
[through examining models that] consider[] individuals and their identity
characteristics, their environments, and normative practices and institutions, across
time and cultures.”).
212. Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 224.
213. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 322.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 70-73 (1995); Barbara
Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer
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computerized legal research is “more flexible than the traditional kind, that
it is deeper and more comprehensive, and that it is more creative than what
came before.”216 From the law reform perspective, the transition to
computerized legal research has been heralded as a veritable paradigm shift
that may go so far as to “render the law more humane,”217 by “burst[ing]
the bonds of conservatism and generat[ing] a dynamic that will breathe new
life into the common law.”218 Computerized legal research then has been
commonly characterized as a transformative technology that has the
potential to effect progressive law reform.
The rationale for this belief stems from the mechanical differences in the
two mediums’ search functionality. A print researcher must make
conscious, intensive use of the West Topic and Key Number system: West
explicitly channels the researcher’s efforts.219 But online legal research
instead is driven by keyword search functionality, wherein the researcher
supposedly “may frame any type of search query” through the selection and
combination of words and phrases.220 In other words, through keyword
searching on databases, the researcher need not consciously engage with
the West Topic and Key Number system—a researcher may simply type
terms, without conscious reference to West categories.221 Because the
researcher supposedly exercises great agency over the results retrieved visà-vis full-text keyword searching in databases, the argument goes that
online research then “free[s] [the researcher] from the filters of categorical
reasoning.”222 Unfortunately, for an array of interconnected reasons,
computerized legal research has failed utterly to achieve such ends.223
After more than three decades, it has catalyzed neither doctrinal creativity
nor law reform.224

Age, 88 L. LIBR. J. 338, 345 (1996); Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 286-89; Robert C.
Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of
Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 29 (1994); Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital
World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403, 477-79 (1994).
216. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 315.
217. Id. at 317.
218. Hanson, supra note 84, at 580.
219. See infra Part I(C)(1).
220. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 316.
221. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 246-47. But see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3,
at 318-19 (explaining that regardless of the resource used, West Topic and Key
Number categories are inscribed in our minds due to such factors as standardized
American legal education).
222. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 316.
223. See id. at 317-26.
224. See id. at 325-28.
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1. Search Algorithms
A fundamental flaw in the assertion that online research transcends legal
categories is that, as covered above, legal categories are now critical
components of legal database search algorithms: WestlawNext is the
epicenter of such search algorithm innovation.225 Because every search
performed on WestlawNext now requires automated input from the West
Topic and Key Number system (i.e., as the system is embedded in the
WestSearch algorithm),226 the age-old “conceptual tyranny” of the West
categorizing scheme has reemerged—albeit in a more insidious form.227
While once the “most obvious difference between print indexing and
CALR indexing is that the latter is constructed by the researcher rather than
by the publisher,” this no longer holds true.228 West’s doctrinal
categorizations now directly influence every search performed on the
database.229
This recent melding of legal categorization systems with database search
algorithms was not an unforeseen development. As Delgado wrote more
than two decades go: “Ironically, a number of observers suggest adding
subject indexing to the LEXIS and WESTLAW systems, thus interposing
another human being’s subjective judgment between researcher and text—
the very thing that computer-assisted legal research was designed to
replace.”230 In a more general sense, Robert Berring too warned against
this eventuality:
[E]ach step in the research process that is carried out automatically by
the front end system, is a step taken away from the purview of the
researcher. Each decision that is built into the system makes the human
who is doing the search one level further removed from the process. If
each user of information was aware of these steps, if each user
understood what was being done for her and could monitor results with a
skeptical eye, the danger would not be so great. But the whole point of
these systems is to work automatically. . . . Most researchers do not
understand how to critically evaluate search results. The emphasis from
the vendors of high-end information will be to lessen that critical
231
evaluation, not enhance it.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.
See id. at 370.
Farmer, supra note 3, at 398.
Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 292.
See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 370.
Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 221-22.
Chaos, supra note 46, at 210.
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West’s doctrinal categories, as automatically—and thus invisibly—
applied to each database search is perhaps a more grievous state of affairs
than West’s formerly explicit channeling influence. In the print medium,
researchers at least had the benefit of better seeing West’s modes of
constraint.232 Therefore, through now more insidious, but perhaps no less
potent means, West’s categories embedded in the WestSearch algorithm
continue to “enable the current system to replicate itself endlessly, easily,
painlessly.”233
Crowdsourcing too is a deeply troubling enhancement of WestSearch.
By applying the research patterns of editorially selected expert users to
each search, crowdsourcing, like the West Topic and Key Number system,
is an agent of homogenization for research outcomes.234 Ron Wheeler
already has taken issue with West’s reliance on crowdsourcing. As
Wheeler writes, reformist-minded attorneys often are “looking to find the
stone left unturned, the less popular result,” and for these “creative thinkers
[who] write about changing the law. . . . The desired results for these sorts
of research inquiries may not fall within the collection of results considered
useful by the masses.”235 Crowdsourcing then likely inhibits law reform.
2. Citation Systems
The “remarkable sameness” of the law is also perpetuated through other
features of commercial legal databases.236 Like the West Topic and Key
Number system, “citation systems are based upon the subjective judgments
of human beings.”237 This inherent bias applies to the historic citator
function of classifying the law’s validity,238 but also to the newer citator
functionality of cross-referencing selected, citing analytical materials.239
On this latter point, publishers always have displayed “policies of
referencing and other publications,” thus perpetuating the “cumulative,
self-perpetuating” nature of commercial research resources.240 That the
232. See Kuh, supra note 84, at 243. But see Construction, supra note 157, at 265
(noting that there are “recurrent, and often inadvertent, examples of ableism is the very
language of critical discourse . . . ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ are used as metaphors
[prominently in OutCrit literature] . . . . Notice how these metaphors privilege
seeing.”).
233. Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 208.
234. Wheeler, supra note 22, at 365.
235. Id. at 366.
236. Triple Helix Dilemma¸ supra note 3, at 207.
237. Callister, supra note 103, at 472.
238. Id.
239. See Wolf & Wishart, supra note 23, at 25.
240. Farmer, supra note 3, at 401.
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KeyCite citator also is embedded in WestSearch only magnifies KeyCite’s
channeling influence.241
In a more general sense, “patterns of citation inclusion, omission, and
emphasis” in legal databases have been of benefit to society’s dominant
interests.242 The legal field has an overall high valuation of citations (one
might say, an obsessive fixation), and the consequences of this
phenomenon are far reaching.243 But in the legal database context, a
concrete example is telling: documents with higher citation counts are
deemed more relevant by search algorithms.244 Likewise, in the
crowdsourcing context, documents with more user “views” are deemed
more relevant. And radical, or otherwise marginalized scholars, whom in
some circumstances have demonstrably lower citation counts or views (i.e.,
as compared to other scholars within the same discourse), therefore
produce articles ranked less relevant by search algorithms.245 The end
result is that such articles with lower relevancy rankings are less likely to
be discovered by researchers.
3. Free Internet Searching
Non-commercial Internet resources used by attorneys similarly exhibit
biases. For example, in the crowdsourcing context, the notion that a system
should “capitalize[] on the wisdom of its users” has long been applied in
the preeminent, free Internet resources, “including wiki creation (e.g.,
Wikipedia) and web searching (e.g., Google).”246 Although commonly
misperceived as something of a normatively neutral modern wonder, on
search engines such as Google, “popular, mainstream and middle of the
road ideas will almost certainly find a voice; one that is likely to be very
loud. However, the unpopular, unique, and minority points of view will
not.”247 Additionally, “search engines wishing to achieve greatest
241. See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.
242. Farmer, supra note 3, at 401 (quoting Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles

from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1457 (1991)).
243. See id.
244. Telephone interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters
(Oct. 1, 2014) (indicating that the number of citation counts for law review articles on
WestlawNext is one factor, among many, in relevancy calculations via WestSearch).
245. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 401; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 366
(“WestlawNext’s search algorithm may rank seldom-viewed documents lower than
frequently viewed documents, which may require the user to scroll down significantly
to locate such items. Perhaps these esoteric items will not display at all.”).
246. Wheeler, supra note 22, at 365.
247. AMANDA SPINK & MICHAEL ZIMMER, WEB SEARCH: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 17 (2008) (citing MANUEL GONZALEZ & RICHARD DELGADO, THE
POLITICS OF FEAR (2006)).
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popularity. . . . tend to cater to majority interests’. . . . According to
Google’s founders, this bias was by design.”248 Like commercial legal
databases, free Internet resources then also exhibit a subjectivity bias and
channel the efforts of legal researchers accordingly.
4. Fact-Based Searching
Such are the flaws of leading, contemporary online legal research
resources; but even prior to the advent of WestSearch and Google,
computerized legal research yielded little in the way of progressive law
reform.249 What accounts for this failing? For one, the shift to
computerized legal research, with its dependence on keyword searching,
resulted in attorneys transitioning from legal concept-based searching to
fact-based searching.250
An attorney researching online typically does a word search, looking for
cases containing the same facts. If the search retrieves a number of cases
with similar facts, the attorney may be satisfied with the outcome.
However, a search that discovers factually similar cases does not also
offer a theory of law as its natural result. Additional work and creative
energy on the part of the researcher are required to formulate a legal
theory. . . . The attorney may not consider the importance of the context
of the facts or the role that fairness or justice might play in making a
persuasive case for the client. The attorney may remain at the factual
251
level, failing to consider legal concepts or public policy arguments.

Of course, before an attorney can de- and reconstruct legal categories,
the supposedly controlling doctrinal categories must first be discovered.
Rather than interrogating and critically reconstructing existing legal
categories, online keyword searching instead encourages researchers to
drown “in a sea of facts.”252
Online legal research also inhibits browsing, and without browsing, the
researcher exhibits a “tendency to remain at a factual-level analysis.”253
248. Id. (quoting Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the
Politics of Search Engines Matters, 16.3 THE INFO. SOC’Y, 169, 176 (2000)); see also
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 324 (“Most material on the Internet comes
arranged in order of frequency of use . . . . This ‘popularity contest’ approach to listing
information builds in a structural bias in favor of commonplace items that have found
wide use. Heretical or new ideas [can be more difficult to locate].”).
249. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 325-28.
250. Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 789-90.
251. Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 297-98.
252. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 319.
253. Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 298; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
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The print medium traditionally provides a rich, expansive environment in
which to engage with legal texts imaginatively.254 For instance, a print
researcher may swiftly and tactilely flip through multiple pages, intuitively
switching from text, to section outline, to new volume, etc. Also, a print
researcher using print indexes and West Digests is likely to at least glance
at adjacent, tangential categories on the page.255 These strategies are
important for law reform because “browsing encourages the development
of analogical or metaphorical reasoning and legal arguments,” allowing the
researcher to “stretch existing theories to cover new factual settings.”256 In
short, print browsing facilitates law reform as it provides ample
opportunities to creatively engage with legal concepts.
Online legal research, on the other hand, traditionally has restricted
browsing. Computers and legal database interfaces “generally only allow[]
a small amount of information to be accessible on each screen,” thus
limiting the online researcher’s browsing environment.257 Stated otherwise,
tangential, browse-worthy data are scarce on commercial legal databases,
reducing the potential for serendipitous discoveries.258 For example, online
cases are retrieved predominantly via fact-based keywords—not through
lists of browsable legal categories on West Topic and Key Number subject
index pages.259 Moreover, locating and using browse-friendly tools such as
digitized subject indexes and tables of contents remains a difficult prospect
due to interface limitations.260 The online medium then has historically
constricted browsing, and thus the “development of analogical or
metaphorical reasoning” that law reform often requires.261
5. West’s Hegemony
The issues discussed thus far involve the problematic aspects of online
legal research resources per se. However, perhaps the most devastating—
and enduring—critical insight is that, regardless of the resource utilized,
3, at 318; Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 782-83.
254. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320-21; Haigh, supra note 184, at
261 (“[S]ince computer research discourages analogical reasoning and browsing, the
researcher wandering the stacks of a library is much more likely to have intuitive
flashes leading to intellectual discovery than someone sitting at a terminal.”).
255. See id.
256. See id. at 320.
257. Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 298.
258. See id.
259. Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 789-90.
260. See Julie M. Jones, Not Just Key Numbers and Keywords Anymore: How User
Interface Design Affects Legal Research, 101 L. LIBR. J. 7, 18-19 (2009).
261. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320.

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss4/3

42

Stump: Following New Lights

2015]

FOLLOWING NEW LIGHTS

615

West’s legal categories remain “inscribed in our minds” due to West’s
century-long hegemony.262
It is perhaps no longer common knowledge that the West Topic and Key
Number system formed the very architecture of the Langdellian law school
curriculum. As is readily apparent from the West system outline: “The
first-year courses Langdell established at the Harvard Law School track the
digest classification scheme. The major digest classifications—property,
contracts, torts, and crimes—are the subject matter of introductory law
school courses. Individual digest topics are the subject matter of other law
school courses.”263 Understanding this, one can hardly overstate the
pervasive influence of the West Topic and Key Number system on
American legal culture.264 In learning and understanding our law—in
“knowing” our law—one quite literally internalizes the dictates of the West
commercial system.265
The direct research implications of the West system’s influence on the
American law school curriculum are clear. Contemporary researchers
seldom make use of West’s bound Digest volumes—but West’s channeling
effect on research outcomes extends far beyond the printed page.
The very categorical structure that limited paper-and-pencil searching,
building in a bias for the status quo, appears in a new form—the
straitjacket of conventional categories now limits the questions one may
ask the computer and the searches one may devise. The terms and
concepts—familiar from the old digest and index categories and
reinforced by disciplinary habits, bar examination requirements, and the
legal curriculum—that formerly steered searchers in predictable
directions reappear in more insidious form. Now inscribed in our minds,
266
they limit the questions a researcher can ask.

The “conceptual tyranny” of the West system extends to any resources—
print or online, commercial or non-commercial—a Langdellian-trained
attorney might utilize.267
When formulating a keyword search on Fastcase, the Cornell Legal
Information Institute, Google, etc., the researcher’s words and phrases do
not materialize spontaneously from a tabula rasa-like legal

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 318.
Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 287.
Id.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310.
Id. at 318.
Farmer, supra note 3, at 398.
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consciousness.268 Such terms are derived from long immersion within
West’s legal universe.269 As Berring writes: “those who use the system
tend to conceptualize in terms of the system and, as a system matures, it
becomes authoritative, the classification system simply describes the
universe. Researchers mature using it, organize their thoughts around it,
and it then defines the world of ‘thinkable thoughts.’”270 For the American
attorney, the “world of thinkable thoughts” is governed almost exclusively
by West.271
D. Stalled Law Reform Movement
The inherent flaws of the online medium, while problematic for a
researcher in any circumstance, are in fact exceptionally exacerbated for the
attorney pursuing law reform initiatives.272 Online search methodologies
are “least useful where one needs them most—when trying to take the
measure of a new legal problem or issue.”273
The individual elements required for a new theory may “lie somewhere
in a database.”274 However, a legal database is incapable of perceiving
social injustices and transforming legal categories accordingly. Our
machines are smart, but not that smart: “[t]he decision to put [legal
concepts] together in a novel way must come from a human researcher.”275
268. See Haigh, supra note 184, at 261 (“Many researchers will likely adopt
standard legal forms of classification learned through textbooks or from lawyers with
certain ideas about the organization and structure of law.”).
269. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 318.
270. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 310-11 (2000) [hereinafter Thinkable Thoughts].
271. Id; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 309-10.
272. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 18.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 321.
275. Id. To disrupt notions of human exceptionalism, we also might begin to think
seriously about how law reform—as an ontological practice—might be approached
from non-human modes of being. See, e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Property on the
Borderline: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Status of Animals in Canada and the
United States, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 313, 316 (2012) (“‘[A]nimalfriendly’ [law reform efforts to date] are still anthropocentric, as they are often
animated by the value placed on human relationships with animals (and thus focus on
humans), rather than the value of animals themselves. The logic of human domination
and hierarchy is not questioned in these cases and statutes.”). Obviously, this is a
daunting proposition. For an influential work on the potential impossibility of such an
enterprise, see Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 THE PHIL. REV. 435
(1974); see also Steven W. Teppler, Testable Reliability: A Modernized Approach to
ESI Admissibility, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 255 (2014) (citing A. M. Turing,
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433-34 (1950)) (“The Turing
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But for the prior three decades, such critical strategies have not been
cultivated: “[m]indless computerized searching” has become the status quo
to the profound loss of the progressive liberatory movement.276 The online
medium then “has not been a godsend for legal reformers,” and instead has
“actively impeded the search for new theories and remedies.”277
As demonstrated by Delgado and Stefancic, “the pace of law reform
seems to have slowed since [electronic searching] arrived in the early
1980s.”278 Before the computerized research era, there stretched a long
period of “legal ferment” wherein attorneys devised progressive reforms in
such areas as civil rights, consumer’s rights, and environmental
protection.279 But in the online research era, such reforms stalled.
Color-blind jurisprudence has slowed the pace of racial reform, and
when legislators imposed tort reforms limiting the ability of consumers
and victims of medical malpractice to recover for their injuries, the tort
bar had little response. Similarly, when conservative judges and
legislators began limiting consumer remedies, for example, by insisting
that patients mediate their claims against HMOs and doctors who
committed malpractice, lawyers responded with no new legal theories,
280
even though many were (and still are) available.

Although the transition to online legal research was, of course, only one
factor among many that slowed the pace of law reform, 281 Delgado and
Stefancic make a convincing case for its role. Thus, due in part to the
factors surveyed above, the doctrinal breakthroughs of the 1950s and 1960s
largely waned following the so-called computer revolution.

Test is a proposal for a test of a machine’s capability to demonstrate thought. . . . It
proceeds as follows: a human judge engages in a natural language conversation with
two other parties, one a human and the other a machine; if the judge cannot reliably tell
which is which, then the machine is said to pass the test.”); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do
Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 473
(2011) (“In terms of intelligent artifacts, the questions are: What can we do, in
changing ourselves, in changing animals, and in developing ‘thinking’ machines? What
should we do?”) (emphasis added).
276. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 321.
277. Id. at 328.
278. Id. at 317.
279. See id. at 325–28.
280. Id. at 327.
281. See id. at 327-28 (“[M]any factors—conservative Republican administrations,
a backlash against the ‘wild’ sixties and seventies, and globalization—may have played
a part in slowing the pace of law reform, at least of the progressive kind.”).
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E. Contemporary Critical Research Process
For the contemporary attorney pursuing progressive law reform
initiatives, a number of critical strategies are perhaps uniquely suited for
our online age. An overview of such strategies is not and could not be
definitive. Legal research technologies change daily (Moore’s Law
apparently governs now as well as ever),282 and critical research, as an
inherently creative process, by its very nature resists a formulaic
application.283 However, based on the insights proffered by luminaries
within the discourse to date, the following critical strategies may function
admirably as starting points for the researcher pursuing legal innovation.
Most aptly, the strategies below may be characterized as just one potential
version of a reconstructed legal research process.
1. Internalize Critical Insights
A researcher ought to internalize the central, critical analysis of the
research process, as discussed above in this Article and covered fully in the
broader literature. Such familiarization is imperative, as the researcher
must establish a background foundation upon which to contextualize and to
thereafter deploy more concrete critical strategies. For example, the critical
research project depends upon a willingness to imaginatively de- and
reconstruct legal concepts,284 an endeavor legitimized, in part, by the
understanding that refined notions of doctrinal indeterminacy are no longer
radical notions—but instead are the increasingly accepted norm.285
Additionally, a reformist-minded attorney ought to familiarize herself
with the historical development of the legal publishing industry. That a
transnational triumvirate of legal publishers almost exclusively controls the
means of commercial legal resource production, and that West in particular
has held a century-long hegemony over legal categorizations, is
extraordinarily pertinent to the attorney attempting to transcend existing
systems of legal-conceptual constraint.286
The researcher must also be fluent in the precise mechanics through
which contemporary legal resources perpetuate the societal status quo. One
must be aware of the West Topic and Key Number system’s continued (and
282. John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991,
1013 (2014) (“The main driver of continuing legal search improvement is Moore’s
law. . . . Moore noticed that the number of transistors on an integrated circuit had
roughly doubled every year over the previous seven years. With uncanny consistency,
the exponential growth Moore identified has continued over the past forty-six years.”).
283. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 222.
284. See id.
285. See Tushnet, supra note 169, at 108.
286. See Gallacher, supra note 14, at 51.
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multifaceted) ascendency, problematic search algorithm enhancements, the
closed loop effect of brand-based resource cross-referencing, and so on.287
To be sure, a reformist-minded attorney must understand just how legal
research databases continue to function as agents of homogenization for
research outcomes.
2. Concept-Based Research
With such a background foundation established, an attorney may then
engage in a traditional, concept-based legal research process. Using
databases or print legal resources, if available, the researcher should
determine how the given fact pattern likely will be characterized within the
existing unreconstructed legal landscape (i.e., the classic hunt for the
supposed ratio decidendi).288 The researcher should cultivate conceptbased legal research methodologies, as opposed to purely fact-based
methods, to locate such “controlling” legal categories that will serve as
starting points for the critical interrogation of the existing legal framework
at issue.289
There are a number of concept-based research methodologies. These
may include the usage of a wide range of secondary resources, which
naturally function to categorize areas of law, and the West Topic and Key
Number system (e.g., as embedded in online West headnote
functionality).290 An additional concept-based methodology includes
reading all found authorities in full—as opposed to mere selective
skimming, which online research likely encourages.291 The researcher
should consider using print legal resources when possible to maximize
browsing opportunities, and thus also maximize analogical reasoning.292
3. Alternative Legal Resources
When searching online for doctrinal legal content, an attorney may
consider using such alternative resources as Fastcase, the Cornell Legal
Information Institute, and GPO FDsys.293 While any online resource is
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See Part II(C).
See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 319–21.
See id.
See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 294.
See, Ian Rowlands et al., The Google Generation: The Information Behaviour
of The Researcher of The Future, 60.4 ASLIB J. OF INFO. MGMT., 290, 294 (2008) (“In
general terms, this new form of information seeking behaviour can be characterised as
being horizontal, bouncing, checking and viewing in nature. Users are promiscuous,
diverse and volatile. . . . “).
292. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310.
293. See generally Justiss, supra note 66 (discussing that large law firms do not
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inherently biased,294 these alternative resources at least are devoid of many
of the explicit commercial channeling agents endemic to the premier legal
databases.295 Alternative resources may provide more neutral avenues
through which to view the law.
4. Legal Scholarly and Multidisciplinary Research
After researching the existing doctrinal landscape, a next step may
involve mining legal scholarly and related cross- and multidisciplinary
resources. As Farmer writes, “often we fail to look outside the system box
in which we are conceptually housed.”296 Searching “outside the system
box” is an enterprise traditionally reserved for legal theorists alone, and so
“practitioners are often insulated from external questions.”297 Thus,
practitioners pursuing systemic change ought to go “beyond the usual”
legal resources and should “join legal theorists” in using “materials that
reflect on social, political, and cultural theory.”298
For the attorney searching for law reform ideas vis-à-vis scholarly texts
within the commercial legal databases, law review articles, as a selected
source or sub-database, are the obvious starting places. Delgado and
Stefancic, for example, reference “recent law review articles by critical
race feminists” as inspirational sources for a novel “intersectional
discrimination” cause of action.299 Thousands of contemporary law review
mandate the use of primary source alternatives to Westlaw and Lexis).
294. See supra text accompanying note 248.
295. See Farris, supra note 77, at 27–28.
296. Farmer, supra note 3, at 403.
297. Id.
298. Id. See also Julie Krishnaswami, Critical Information Theory: A New
Foundation for Teaching Regulatory Research, in THE BOULDER STATEMENTS ON
LEGAL RESEARCH EDUCATION: THE INTERSECTION ON INTELLECTUAL SKILLS AND
PRACTICAL SKILLS 175, 175 (2014) (“[I]n legal research instruction, students are rarely
exposed to interdisciplinary research methods or perspectives that will help them
consider the more profound and complex aspects of legal information resources.”);
Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like A Public Interest Lawyer: Theory,
Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455, 459 (2010) (“While
the Carnegie Report discusses the legal profession as a whole, some scholars have
suggested that its emphasis on integrating theory, practice, and morality has special
significance for those committed to public interest law, given the inherently normative
character of public interest legal practice . . . .”); Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto,
Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379, 387 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (exploring the
role of “activist lawyers as theorists” through asking such questions as “how can civilrights lawyers draw more deeply from the well of critical race insights to energize and
sometimes refocus efforts in the trenches?”).
299. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320.
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articles from most legal journals can be found in commercial legal
databases.
However, not all commercial firm plans provide complete access to legal
periodicals, and the most recent articles and niche legal journals are often
absent from the commercial databases entirely.300 For access to such
scholarship, researchers should make use of the free, online repositories
such as SSRN and the Bepress Law Review Commons.301
To truly “search outside the system box,” researchers also may seek out
cross- and multidisciplinary materials.302 Online repositories make
available scholarship across all disciplines—not just law; leading
repositories include SSRN, Digital Commons, and JSTOR “Register &
Read.”303 Google Books, a repository containing millions of scanned
books (including academic monographs) also may constitute a useful
research resource.304 An attorney may seek out relevant interdisciplinary
materials through local academic libraries.
5. Unplugging and Brainstorming Sessions
After such resource-gathering methods have been exhausted, an attorney
may engage in (more purely) analytical strategies. Perhaps most
importantly, the critical researcher should, at this point, consider
unplugging. For Delgado and Stefanicic, unplugging is indeed a key
component of the contemporary critical process:
One possibility that we must entertain is that when searching for a new
legal remedy, we should turn our computers off. Lawyers interested in
representing clients who (unlike corporations) do not find a ready-made
body of developed law in their favor need to spend time with the
computer shut down, mulling over what an ideal legal world would look
like from the client’s perspective. . . . In this exercise, the free
305
association of ideas, policies, and social needs will play a large part.

The endgame of the critical project—”radically transforming legal
300.
301.
302.
303.

See Ramsay, supra note 80, at 141, n. 18. 20.
See Arewa supra note 49, at 808-9.
Farmer, supra note 3, at 403-4.
See Arewa supra note 49, at 809-10; see also Andrée J. Rathemacher,
Developing Issues in Licensing: Text Mining, MOOCs, and More, 39.3 SERIALS REV.
205, 207 (2013).
304. Giancarlo F. Frosio, Google Books Rejected: Taking the Orphans to the
Digital Public Library of Alexandria, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
81, 84 (2011).
305. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328.
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doctrines”—has remained fundamentally unchanged in the online era.306
But as doctrinal innovation ultimately depends upon people, not computers,
cultivating a people-based analytical methodology is essential for
genuinely effective law reform.307 Brainstorming sessions with diverse
perspectives at play is a particularly apt strategy for law reform, because
progressive movements, by their very nature, are often defined by
collaborative discourse.308
Researchers contemplating law reform strategies and their collaborators
need not be members of the elite intelligentsia or the greater progressive
status quo.309 Perhaps the very opposite is preferable. As Delgado and
Stefancic write, few attorneys successfully “break free from the constraints
of preexisting thought” and proffer “effective new approaches.”310 But
such thinkers who do often are “individuals whose life experiences have
differed markedly from those of their contemporaries. They may be
members of marginal groups, or persons who are in other ways separated
from the mainstream.”311 Individuals from all corners of the legal
profession may have much to add to the law reform landscape. So too,
may non-lawyer citizens and activists: to be sure, “[i]nvolving the
community can assist in effective law reform strategies.”312 For instance,
“synergies between activists working for social change and lawyers seeking
law reform”313 may produce the most dynamic sociolegal change, in that

306. Id.
307. See id. at 321. But see Maneesha Deckha, Property on the Borderline: A

Comparative Analysis of the Legal Status of Animals in Canada and the United States,
20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 313, 316 (2012).
308. See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory’s Cutting
Edge: Key Movements That Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 51 (Francisco Valdes et. al. eds., 2002) (“Synergism is a
vitally important possibility for a project, such as CRT, that attempts to affect the
political world though discursive intervention. Such a project is necessarily collective
and collaborative, requiring analysis of information and exchange of insights gleaned
from the experiences of [many] movements . . . .”).
309. See Duncan Kennedy, Political Power and Cultural Subordination, in AFTER
IDENTITY: READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 95 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds.,
2013) (noting that the United States still is marked by an “overwhelmingly white legal
intelligentsia.”).
310. Triple Helix Dilemma¸ supra note 3, at 222.
311. Id. at 223.
312. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
COMMONWEALTH: SOME CRITICAL ISSUES FOR ACTION IN THE DECADE 2005-2015 49
(2004).
313. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from A Law
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 203 (2001).
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“each activity can catalyze and in turn be amplified by the other.”314
Diverse voices then ought to be a vital component of any meaningful law
reform undertaking.
IV. APPLICATION OF CRITICAL LEGAL RESEARCH: MOUNTAINTOP
REMOVAL LAW REFORM
This Article now has detailed the collective problematic aspects of the
following: the legal publishing industry, the preeminent print and online
legal research resources, and the legal research process as traditionally
conceived. Based on the insights developed in the existing literature, this
Article then put forth a loose constellation of strategies that may together
constitute one reconstructed version of the legal research process—as
imbued with critical theory and pertinent related discourses. This Article
now will pivot, by providing an overview of the law governing
mountaintop removal mining and the various reform strategies put forth by
commentators aiming to halt this destructive mining practice. Lastly, the
critical research strategies outlined above will be applied to the law
governing mountaintop removal mining, demonstrating that core feminist
methodologies may dramatically alter the mountaintop removal law reform
landscape.
A. Mountaintop Removal Law
The central Appalachian region of the United States, after more than a
century of exploitation at the hands of the coal extraction industry, is
perhaps a supreme exemplar of the phenomenon known as the resource
curse. Alternatively termed the paradox of plenty, the resource curse is “a
designation that denotes a pattern of social, political, and economic
problems in areas rich in natural resources.”315
Presumably, such resource-rich regions would boast high standards of
living; however, outside economic interests—the coal industry, in this
context—”wield[] power over the [region] at the expense of its citizens and
the natural environment.”316 That the coal industry is perennially aided by
captured ruling elites (e.g., state politicians, regulatory officials, etc.), and
has gained the widespread support of the very citizens it subjugates most
egregiously, are defining characteristics of the Appalachian resource
curse.317 One might say that, in Appalachia, coal controls all: vast
314. Id. at 176; see also Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that “[o]rganized masses of
people, not lawyers, play the critical roles” in any progressive reform movement).
315. STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 23.
316. Id. at 24.
317. Id. at 24–26.
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intersections exist “between environmental problems caused by coal
operations . . . and the iniquitous social and economic conditions” of the
region.318
Any efforts then to achieve transformative change in Appalachia
necessarily must involve reform to the sociolegal apparatus governing the
coal extraction industry: the epicenter of harm.319 For the last two decades,
mountaintop removal mining has emerged as the increasingly dominant
surface mining practice in the region, due to (1) amendments to the Clean
Air Act, which have incentivized coal burning plants to favor the lowsulfur coal endemic to central Appalachia; and (2) advances in pertinent
mining technology, such as the development of massive excavation
equipment.320 As reported by the Congressional Research Service,
mountaintop removal mining now has swelled to “an area of approximately
12 million acres located in portions of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia,
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.”321
Mountaintop removal also ranks among the most destructive mining
techniques yet devised, scouring Appalachian communities and
surrounding ecosystems alike.322 Thus, from a law reform perspective,
mountaintop removal jurisprudence is an ideal site from which to pursue
reform vis-à-vis critical legal research strategies.
1. Mining Process
The mountaintop removal mining process is as follows. Mining
operations use explosives to blast off mountaintops—up to a thousand feet
of each peak—revealing rich seams of coal.323 After the coal is extracted,
mining operations may qualify for variances exempting the companies
from restoration requirements.324 In those instances where federal law does
require the industry to restore the “approximate original contour”325 of the
mountain, the original contour is restored in only a superficial sense, as
operations meet the requirements by dumping a portion of the blasted
318. Id. at 23.
319. Id. at 23–26; see also Isaac Forman, The Uncertain Future of NEPA and

Mountaintop Removal, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 163, 165 (2011) (“Ever since miners
battled coal companies for the right to unionize early in the twentieth century, coal and
politics in West Virginia have been inseparable.”).
320. See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 28, at 631–32.
321. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP
MINING: BACKGROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2014).
322. See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 28, at 632–33.
323. Id. at 631.
324. See Gersen, supra note 32, at 458.
325. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012).
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materials back on the site. 326 That is, through such dumping practices, the
pre-mined, diverse woodland ecosystems are not restored; monolithic
grasslands atop “rounded hilltops bare scant resemblance to the natural
landscape.”327
The remnants of the blasted peaks, constituting tons of rock and soil,
known as “overburden” or “excess soil,” are piled permanently in valleys
adjacent to the mountains.328 The dumped materials create valley fills that
often rise “hundreds of feet high on top of headwater streams.” 329 Valley
fills are responsible for much of the overarching damage wrought by
mountaintop removal.330
Indeed, the direct environmental and human health harms of
mountaintop removal are legion. Over one thousand miles of crucial,
headwater streams have been “directly impacted”331 and in many instances,
completely “obliterated”332 by valley fill operations. As the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Services reports: “the loss of these streams and their associated
forests may have ecosystem-wide implications.”333 Moreover, mountaintop
removal mining is linked to increased flash flooding, and the affected
waters downstream from valley fills contain elevated levels of such toxic
chemicals as selenium, sulfates, aluminum, zinc, and BTEX compounds,
all of which are harmful to aquatic life—and to the Appalachian people
drinking the water.334
Mountaintop removal mining also produces elevated levels of “airborne
hazardous dust,” and demonstrably causes “increased adult hospitalizations
for lung cancer, heart, lung, kidney disease, and chronic pulmonary

326. See Gersen, supra note 32, at 458–59.
327. See id. at 459-61 (“[I]t may never be possible to resurrect an Appalachian

forest on a blasted mountain because MTR removes the topsoil and drainage features
that allow native trees to take root.”).
328. Michael Braverman, King of the Hill: Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v.
Aracoma Coal Company and the Battle Raging Between the Coal Industry and
Environmentalists over Mountaintop Mining, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 296 (2010).
329. Isaac Forman, The Uncertain Future of NEPA and Mountaintop Removal, 36
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 163, 165 (2011).
330. See id.
331. EPA, MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA, FINAL
PROGRAMMATIC
EIS
4
(2005),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/region03/mtntop/eis2005.htm.
332. Gersen, supra note 32, at 462.
333. Pick and Shovel, supra note 38, at 57 (quoting U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Report to EPA Region III dated September 23, 1998).
334. Forman, supra note 319, at 168; S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G
Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560, 562 (4th Cir. 2014).
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disorders; and elevated mortality rates.”335 Recent studies also have
established a link between mountaintop removal and birth defects in
Appalachia.336 These costs ultimately are not borne by the coal industry,
but instead largely fall on Appalachian coal mining communities, thus
constituting textbook examples of negative economic externalities.337
2. Regulation Under the CWA and NEPA
An attorney conducting traditional, concept-based legal research on
mountaintop removal would discover that a complex schema of federal and
state law, much of it statutory and regulatory-based, has been held to
govern the mining practice.
Mountaintop removal, like all mining, is highly regulated. The dangers
of mountaintop removal can be regulated through the common law of
torts and property, state statutes, as well as broad federal statutes such as
the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), the Clean
Water Act (CWA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Although not an affirmative source of regulatory authority, the
Environmental Justice Executive Order (E.O. 12,898) is also relevant to
mountaintop removal due to its potential impact on low-income
338
populations.

Thus, in the search for justice, a wide range of law potentially is
implicated in efforts to halt or to otherwise internalize externalities caused
by mountaintop removal operations.
In particular, much of the
controversial mountain removal litigation to date has focused on federal
agency action vis-à-vis provisions of these key federal statutes.339
SMCRA, a federal statute that effectively curtailed the worst mining
practices in Appalachia (i.e., before the emergence of mountaintop removal
mining) mandates a cooperative federalism schema for surface mining. 340
Minimum standards are set at the federal level, and the states then
335. Forman, supra note 319, at 168.
336. See Smith, supra note 29, at 175. See generally Melissa M. Ahern et al., The

Association Between Mountaintop Mining and Birth Defects Among Live Births in
Central Appalachia, 1996-2003, 111.6 ENVTL. RESEARCH 838 (2011).
337. See generally McGinley & Haden, supra note 12, at 258.
338. Smith, supra note 29, at 179.
339. See Gersen, supra note 32, at 472.
340. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (2012); see Pick and Shovel, supra note 38, at 54 (“In the
quarter century since enactment of SMCRA, the environmental degradation and
attendant adverse social and economic impacts on coalfield communities continue,
albeit not at the catastrophic levels that existed in the pre-SMCRA years when coal
mining was essentially unregulated.”).
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promulgate comprehensive plans to meet those standards.341 SMCRA sets
the “approximate original contour” standard for mountaintop removal
mining,342 and also makes provision for a buffer zone rule, requiring
mining operations to meet certain environmental standards when operating
within one hundred feet of applicable streams.343
SMCRA has a savings clause providing that the Act shall not be
construed as superseding the CWA,344 and the CWA is implicated when
mountaintop removal operations dump excess spoil into headwaters.345
The CWA requires that valley fill operations obtain permits, which are
issued through two programs.346 The first is the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program, wherein permits are
issued by the EPA or EPA-approved state permitting authorities under
CWA § 402.347 The second is the dredge and fill permitting program
administered by the Army Corps of Engineers under CWA § 404.348
The EPA’s role vis-à-vis CWA § 404 bares close scrutiny. While
Congress delegated the sole power to grant or deny dredge and fill permits
341. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2012); see Jason Rapp, Coal and Water: Reclaiming the
Clean Water Act for Environmental Protection, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 104–05 (2011).
342. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012).
343. 30 C.F.R. § 715.17(d)(3) (2014); see also 30 C.F.R. § 816.57 (2014)
invalidated by Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, No. CV 09-00115 (BJR),
2014 WL 5355048, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2014). The Office of Surface Mining’s
original buffer zone rule—the 1983 stream buffer zone rule—was revised in 2008. But
in 2014, the District Court for the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2008 rule. See COPELAND,
supra note 321, at 7 (“The Obama Administration [sought to return the 2008 rule] to
the more stringent 1983 rule . . . . In February 2014, the same federal court ruled that
the 2008 rule had been issued without necessary consultation with federal wildlife
agencies.”). For a discussion on current efforts to revise the rule, see id. at 10.
344. 30 U.S.C. §1292(a)(3) (2012); see Rapp, supra note 341, at 104–05. The CWA
was passed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
345. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 190 (4th
Cir. 2009); Rapp, supra note 341, at 104–05.
346. See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
347. 33 U.S.C. §§1342, 1362(12) (2012), see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v.
Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 2009) (“States wishing to administer
their own NPDES program must be approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency . . . before they can begin issuing § 402 permits.”).
348. 33 U.S.C. §1344 (2012), see also Laura Kathryn Bomyea, Note, Dynamite,
Disaster and Disappearing Options: How the EPA Is Losing the Battle Against
Destructive Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining Practices, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 224,
233 (2013) (“[Mountaintop removal mining] also grew exponentially under President
George W. Bush, due in large part to the Administration’s redefinition of ‘fill material’
which exempted ‘mine overburden’ from regulation under the CWA § 402, ensuring
that the material was regulated exclusively under CWA § 404.”).
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to the Corps,349 CWA § 404 permits must be issued in accordance with the
standards promulgated by the EPA, which are known as the § 404(b)(1)
guidelines.350 A public interest review also is required prior to permit
issuances.351 Additionally, the EPA is granted, through CWA § 404(c),352
the right “to deny or restrict the use of certain areas as fill disposal sites due
to environmental concerns.”353 The EPA has also exercised advisory roles
to the Corps via extra-statutory functions.354
NEPA requires agencies “proposing major federal actions ‘significantly
affecting’ the human environment [to] complete an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) before commencing the project.”355 Recent litigation has
stemmed from the Corps’ failure to prepare an adequate EIS for
mountaintop removal operations, as required by the CWA.356
Unfortunately, a “history of adverse outcomes for environmental
plaintiffs” largely has marked the pursuit of “court enforcement of federal
environmental laws” governing mountaintop removal operations.357 A
plain reading of applicable federal statutes—especially the CWA and
NEPA—supports most arguments to date proffered by environmental
349. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
350. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2012); see Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 624 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev’d and vacated sub
nom. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“The underlying intent behind the 404(b)(1) Guidelines is that dredged or fill material
should not be discharged if it will result in an unacceptable adverse impact on the
aquatic ecosystem”). The guidelines are codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 230.
351. See Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F.
Supp. 2d 670, 685 (W.D. Ky. 2013) aff’d sub nom. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(a)(1) (2014) and Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2012) [hereinafter E.O. 12,898]). Due to its centrality in the illustrative
reform proposals put forth in this Article, an expanded discussion of the mountaintop
removal public interest review criteria is provided below in Part III.B.3.a.
352. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012).
353. Bomyea, supra note 348, at 249 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012)).
354. See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“So
plaintiffs’ objection here is simply to enhanced consultation and coordination between
two federal agencies. But no statutory provision forbids EPA from consulting with or
coordinating with the Corps, or vice versa.”).
355. Rapp, supra note 341, at 100 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012)); see also
Forman, supra note 319, at 169–70 (“NEPA is a procedural statute, focused on
ensuring informed decision-making rather than compelling particular results or
imposing substantive obligations.”).
356. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 197
(4th Cir. 2009).
357. Gersen, supra note 32, at 472.
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plaintiffs.358 Indeed, the Southern District of West Virginia, the venue in
which most anti-mountaintop removal suits have been litigated, has largely
ruled in accordance with such claims.359 However, time and time again, at
the appellate level, the “Fourth Circuit’s inclination to defer to permitting
agencies, and the Court’s unwillingness to enforce the application of
federal law by state officials,” has resulted in reversals of the Southern
District.360 Thus, “the higher court has resolved the diverging government
interests . . . in favor of Corps decisions that promote energy extraction,”
even when the “Corps has granted permits in a manner that directly
contradicts the statutory and regulatory commands of NEPA and the
CWA.”361
Numerous cases illustrate this longstanding trend. In Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, environmental plaintiffs alleged that
the Corps violated CWA § 404 and its own regulatory definition of “fill
material” in issuing a mining permit.362 The Southern District of West
Virginia agreed, broadly enjoining the Corps from issuing such overburden
permits “solely for the purpose of waste disposal” under CWA § 404,
citing, in support, both the plain language of CWA § 404 and the
congressional intent of the CWA.363 But the Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding that the injunction was overly broad and finding statutory
ambiguity in CWA § 404—thus entitling the Corps’ interpretation of “fill
material” to Chevron deference.364 Under the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the
end result was that “the Corps could ignore its own regulations defining the
permissible scope of section 404,” in addition to the clear dictates of the
CWA.365
In Bragg v. Robertson, environmental plaintiffs brought a host of claims
under SMCRA, NEPA, and the CWA against the Corps and the West
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

See Rapp, supra note 341, at 118.
See id.
Gersen, supra note 32, at 472.
Rapp, supra note 341, at 118.
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927,
930 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) opinion clarified, 206 F. Supp. 2d 782 (S.D.W. Va. 2002)
vacated sub nom. Kentuckians for Commonwealth Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425
(4th Cir. 2003) and vacated sub nom. Kentuckians for Commonwealth Inc. v.
Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). An individual permit or a nationwide
mining (i.e., NWP 21) can be issued under CWA § 404. See COPELAND, supra note
321, at 3 (“The Obama Administration recently added new environmental restrictions
on the use of NWP 21 generally, while permanently prohibiting its use to authorize
discharges to construct valleys fills, such as occurs in the Appalachian region . . . .”).
363. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 940, 946.
364. Id. at 927.
365. Rapp, supra note 341, at 110.
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Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP).366 Ruling on
the key issue (that did not settle) at trial, the Southern District enjoined the
WVDEP from issuing permits without complying with the SMCRA one
hundred foot buffer zone rule.367 The Fourth Circuit, avoiding these
substantive issues, reversed on sovereign immunity grounds.368
Likewise, in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, the Southern District held that the Corps violated the CWA and
NEPA by failing to inter alia (1) comply with the EPA’s § 404(b)(1)
guidelines, which require the Corps to “assess the effects of the discharge
on the ‘structure and function’ of the aquatic ecosystem” and;369 (2) prepare
an EIS that adequately assessed the “environmental impact” of the CWA §
404 fill permits at issue.370 Again, the Fourth Circuit reversed, giving
deference to the Corps and “accusing the district court of [substituting] its
judgment for that of the agency.”371 The Fourth Circuit again “couched its
approval of extractive activities as judicial deference to Corps expertise.”372
In Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Western District of Kentucky held that the Corps did not violate the CWA
or NEPA in issuing a CWA § 404 fill permit.373 Environmental plaintiffs
alleged that the Corps failed to again take a hard look at “environmental
impacts under NEPA,” and that the Corps did not, in issuing the permit,
consider adverse effects upon water quality—nor upon human health and
welfare—as required by the EPA’s § 404(b)(1) guidelines.374 Plaintiffs
also alleged that the Corps failed to properly consider the “needs and
welfare of the people” in violation of the Corps’ codified public interest
review requirements.375 In making such claims, plaintiffs relied heavily
upon the recent, groundbreaking “human health studies linking mining to

366. See Gersen, supra note 32, at 468.
367. Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 663 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) vacated sub

nom. Bragg v. W. Virginia Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
368. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286.
369. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607,
631, 635-36 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev’d and vacated sub nom. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal.
v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.11
(2014)).
370. 479 F. Supp. 2d at 616, 640–41.
371. Rapp, supra note 341, at 115 (quoting Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 198).
372. Rapp, supra note 341, at 118.
373. Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp.
2d 670, 682-86 (W.D. Ky. 2013) aff’d sub nom. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014).
374. 963 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
375. Id.
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negative health impacts, including increased birth defects.”376 However,
the Court held that the Corps “‘was only required to address the collective
and cumulative effects of the authorized discharges.’ The health studies
were beyond the scope of the COE’s authority and review.”377 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed upon appeal.378
However, in a historic victory, environmental plaintiffs in fact prevailed
in the most recent Fourth Circuit decision on mountaintop removal. In
Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., the Fourth
Circuit held that a mining operator violated the CWA in failing to disclose
its discharge of the pollutant selenium—as was required in its CWA § 402
permit application.379 Although the operator alleged that the “permit
shield” defense precluded liability, the Court correctly held that this
defense is unavailable for such a pollutant disclosure failure.380 In a
striking shift in tone, the Court concluded its decision by stating: “To allow
the defense in these circumstances would tear a large hole in the CWA,
whose purpose it is to protect the waters of Appalachia and the nation and
their healthfulness, wildlife, and natural beauty.”381
The A & G Coal Corp. decision perhaps at least partially is explained by
the recent reshuffling of the Fourth Circuit’s political composition. As
illustrated in the pre-A & G Coal Corp. decisions, environmental advocates
seeking to end mountaintop removal mining traditionally have received
“favorable district court opinions on the merits, only to be overturned by
the Fourth Circuit.”382 But recent court appointments by President Obama
likely have disrupted this pattern:
Presidential appointments to the Fourth Circuit may provide the most
promising opportunity to alter the legal landscape for mountaintop
mining opponents. The Fourth Circuit is widely perceived to be “the
nation’s most conservative” circuit court, but the confirmation of Obama
appointees Judges Andre Davis, Barbara Milano Keenan, and Albert
Diaz means that for the first time in many years, a majority of Fourth

376. CHAPTER 18 - MINING AND MINERAL EXTRACTION, 2013 “ABA Env’t Energy,
& Resources L.: Year in Rev.” 182, 184 (2013).
377. Id. (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 685).
378. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d at 713.
379. 758 F.3d 560, 569.
380. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2012)).
381. Id.
382. Sara Clark, In the Shadow of the Fourth Circuit: Ohio Valley Environmental
Coalition v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 143
(2008).
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383

Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s shifting composition indeed may have
“temper[ed] the court’s apparent hostility to environmental plaintiffs,”
which may result in further victories for anti-mountaintop mining
advocates.384
As regards the EPA’s CWA § 404(c) veto power and its extra-statutory
guidance prerogatives, the most recent decisions from the District of
Columbia Circuit Court have also been more favorable for antimountaintop removal advocates.385 In Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S.
E.P.A., the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA acted within the scope of CWA
§ 404(c) in “withdraw[ing] a disposal site specification post-permit,”386
because the Act confers on the EPA through the “unambiguous language of
subsection 404(c) . . . a broad veto power extending beyond the permit
issuance.”387
Likewise, in National Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, the D.C. Circuit held that
an interagency coordination plan between the EPA and the Corps, in which
the EPA proffered enhanced, extra-statutory guidance on mountaintop
mining operations, did not violate the CWA.388 The Court also held that
the EPA’s extra-statutory “final guidance” memorandum, which instructed
staff members to recommend limitations on state-issued permits via CWA
§ 402, was also permissible under the CWA—as the memorandum
constitutes a mere “general statement of policy,” as opposed to a binding
legislative rule.389
These decisions from the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit constitute
tangible victories for environmental advocates.
Increased agency
cooperation during crucial, pre-permit periods, a confirmation of the EPA’s
CWA § 404(c) veto power, and a more centrist Fourth Circuit may provide
increased opportunity for meaningful regulation of mountaintop removal
383. Forman, supra note 319, at 193.
384. Id.
385. See, e.g., Big Win for EPA in Mountaintop Mining Case, 35 WESTLAW J.

ENVTL. 1 (2014).
386. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. E.P.A., 714 F.3d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2013) cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540, 188 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2014).
387. Id. at 613. On remand, in considering the mining operator’s remaining APA
counts, the D.C. District Court granted environmental plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment in holding that the EPA properly revoked the permit. Mingo Logan Coal Co.
Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. CV 10-0541 (ABJ), 2014 WL 4828883, at *24
(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2014).
388. See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
389. Id. at 253.
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mining. But such developments, while welcome, are not tantamount to
comprehensive solutions. As one commentator laments: “it would behoove
all parties involved to come up with a better solution . . . . The Clean Water
Act, and principles of environmental justice demand it.”390
3. Common Law Remedies
Turning to common law remedies for mountaintop removal mining,
commentators have posited that potential claims may arise through such
actions as negligence, private nuisance, and public nuisance.391
Environmental plaintiffs pursuing such claims could seek injunctions or
damages, as relevant.392 A private nuisance claim, which may be brought
for any “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land,”393 is applicable because mountaintop removal
“interferes with landowners’ ability to use and enjoy their land . . . by
increasing flood risk, emitting noise and vibrations, and spreading toxic
dust.”394
A public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public,” and an action may lie due to public health concerns
caused by mountaintop removal.395 A public nuisance claim will lie so
long as the “myriad public health consequences stem from aspects of the
practice that current mining regulations do not specifically authorize,” such
as negligent groundwater contamination or harms caused outside the scope
of a permit.396 Negligence claims may be brought against mountaintop
removal operations based on such harms as drinking water
contamination.397
Common law suits, like actions for court enforcement of federal
environmental laws, have yet to systematically curtail mountaintop removal
mining practices. For one, common law actions are normally pursued in
state court, and historically “state court judges [have been] predisposed to
rule for coal companies for political reasons.”398 Also, in the negligence
context, causation is difficult to establish in cases involving medical risk
due to such factors as extended latency periods for diseases caused by toxic

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Bomyea, supra note 348, at 257.
See Gersen, supra note 32, at 477–81.
See id. at 479.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
Gersen, supra note 32, at 478.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
Gersen, supra note 32, at 480.
See id. at 479.
Id. at 477.
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exposure.399 A final problem is that the applicable, established common
law protects people exclusively—not non-human animals or the greater
environment.
Such actions “can only protect the environment
incidentally,” if at all, as mining companies may not be dissuaded from
halting or altering mining practices due to such human-centered claims.400
That said, in the past decade, environmental plaintiffs in Appalachia
have achieved a measure of success in pursuing common law remedies—
and joint common law and statutory citizen suit actions.401 The caveat is
that such successes against mining operations have occurred outside the
specific context of mountaintop removal mining.402 In a suit brought
against A.T. Massey Energy, a combined statutory citizen suit and nuisance
action resulted in both an injunction and a damages award of nearly half a
million dollars for West Virginia coalfield residents.403 As Patrick C.
McGinley writes, such victories certainly should embolden environmental
plaintiffs:
No longer do coal companies go to court with the expectation of
favorable treatment by judges and juries. The fact that citizen plaintiffs
are achieving success as they challenge the excesses of the coal industry
should encourage a second look by plaintiffs’ lawyers whom in the past
404
have shown little interest in taking on such clients.

Therefore, much can be achieved through using common law suits or
“common law and statutory citizen suits in tandem to redress the injuries
caused by mining” in the context of mountaintop removal mining
specifically.405
Beyond the context of litigation, many commentators have put forth
reformist statutory and regulatory strategies for ending mountaintop
removal mining. New federal legislation to amend key provisions of the
CWA may result in greater protections for coalmining communities and the
environment.406 However, such amendments are politically unlikely, as
“highly motivated interest groups like mining companies [are] able to
obtain preferred political outcomes.”407
Similarly, amendments to
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See id. at 479.
Id. at 481.
See Pick and Shovel, supra note at 38, at 106.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 106.
See Gersen, supra note 32, at 473.
Id.
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SMCRA’s regulatory schema may provide enhanced environmental
protection through such avenues as stricter buffer zone requirements.408
But again such amendments require favorable political conditions that
currently appear nonexistent.409 A particularly innovative approach
involves reducing demand for mountaintop removal mining coal through
state legislation that prohibits power companies from purchasing such
coal.410 While commentators predict that such state acts would be largely
symbolic, nevertheless these “proposals can raise awareness about
mountaintop removal, shape norms regarding MTR, and set the tone of the
national debate.”411
B. Critical Research Strategies Applied to Mountaintop Removal Law
Anti-mountaintop removal advocates have made substantial gains
through extraordinary efforts in recent years.412 Furthermore, there is
promise for future litigation victories insofar as the Fourth Circuit, the
Court wherein most environmental citizen suits are brought, becomes more
centrist.
Or perhaps policy oscillation (shifting more firmly in
environmental advocates’ favor) at last will allow for a stringent regulation
of surface mining operations.413 Although not yet broached in this Article,
the dramatic market impact of the Marcellus Shale natural gas boom in
Appalachia—an extraction practice carrying with it its own dire set of
environmental and public health concerns414—may catalyze a post-coal era
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Id. at 476.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 506.
See, e.g., Baller & Pantilat, supra note 28, at 663 (“Attorneys Joe Lovett, Jim
Hecker, and Joan Mulhern are working to [end mountaintop removal mining]. While
the campaign for change has been frustrating and discouraging at times, these attorneys
are committed for the long-haul . . . . The success of the litigation is a manifestation of
their determination and perseverance . . . .”).
413. See Braverman, supra note 328, at 321-23.
414. See Kaitlyn R. Maxwell, Note, Eroding the Public’s Right to Clean Air:
Examination of the Hazardous Air Pollutants Exemption for Natural Gas Drilling
Under the Clean Air Act, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 157 (2011) (“Environmental and
public health scientists, scholars, and policymakers have identified two fundamental
environmental and public health concerns associated with natural gas drilling: (1)
drinking water contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing used to extract natural
gas; and (2) reduced air quality due to the release of hazardous air pollutants during
production.”); John Manuel, Mining: EPA Tackles Fracking. 118.5 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES a118, a199 (2010) (“Some of these deposits, such as the Marcellus Shale
running under the Appalachian Basin, lie beneath watersheds supplying drinking water
to millions of people. In many locations fracking . . . occurs within hundreds of feet of
residences that use wells for drinking water.”).
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sooner than predicted for the region, mixed blessing though that may be.415
Whatever the shifting legal, economic, and ideological landscape may
be, critical legal research strategies will be of service to the reformistminded attorney. Innovative approaches to law and discourse can be as
necessary in good times as in the bad, and as discussed below, halting
mountaintop removal is merely a beginning, and not the end, of easing
Appalachia’s woes. The following section then demonstrates through one
illustration how critical approaches to legal research can assist (i.e., can
serve as one methodology, among a potential great many) in ultimately
achieving such change.
1. Concept-Based Research
In locating the mountaintop removal primary authority above, a wide
range of concept-based legal research strategies may have been used by a
researcher. When searching on an academic subscription to WestlawNext,
a search for “mountaintop removal” within all secondary resources
produces a number of relevant results, many from treatises.416 Such top
treatise results include entries from Public Natural Resources Law, Second
Edition, Rogers’ Environmental Law, Federal Environmental Regulation of
Real Estate Law Digest, and so on—all of which, of course, are Thomson
Reuters products.417 These treatise entries then categorize the law at issue,
listing legal concepts (e.g. “discharges of fill material and other
pollutants”)418 and specific primary authorities (e.g., “In a 2003 decision,
the Fourth Circuit . . .”)419 alike.
An additional concept-based approach involves using the West Topic
and Key Number system, as embedded in WestlawNext. The West
headnotes assigned to the seminal mountaintop removal cases (i.e., in the
415. See, e.g., Sarah Tincher, Report: Market Forces, Not EPA, to Blame for Coal
Decline,
THE
STATE
J.
(Oct.
14,
2014),
available
at
http://www.statejournal.com/story/26883400/report-market-forces-not-epa-to-blamefor-coaldecline; see also Alison Cassady, Complex Market Forces are Challenging
Appalachian Coal Mining, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 06, 2014), available at
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2014/1
0/06/98371/complexmarket-forces-are-challenging-appalachian-coal-mining/
(“Appalachia’s
coal
communities are confronting a confluence of market factors that are years in the
making . . . . including low domestic and international prices for both thermal and
metallurgical coal, soft natural gas prices, and increased imports—primarily from
Colombia.”).
416. Westlaw search performed on WestlawNext on Dec. 14, 2014.
417. 2 PUB. NAT.RES. L. § 19:17 (West 2015); 2 ENVTL. L. § 4:9 (West 2014); FED.
ENVTL. REG. OF REAL ESTATE L. DIG. § 5:4 (West 2014).
418. 2 FED. ENVTL. REG. OF REAL ESTATE § 5:4 (West 2015).
419. Id.
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context of court enforcement of federal environmental laws) are mostly
classified under the topics of Environmental Law, Mines and Minerals,
Statutes, and Administrative Law and Procedure. Prominent key numbers
(or sub-topics) include Coal Mining, Discharge of Pollutants, Permits and
Certifications, Discharge or Deposit of Dredged or Fill Material, Deference
to Agency in General, Wisdom, Judgment or Opinion, Permissible or
Reasonable Construction, Redressability, Cognizable Interests and Injuries,
and Persons Entitled to Sue or Seek Review.420
These West Topic and Key Number categories then, paired with the text
of the West-drafted case headnotes, define the “world of ‘thinkable
thoughts’” (at least to an extent) for the researcher investigating
mountaintop removal case law.421 For one, these West categories in part
drive the keyword search functionality—i.e., via the WestSearch algorithm.
Thus, the West-selected headnote and key number terms govern which
cases are retrieved and ranked according to the system’s relevancy
dictates.422
What is more, as researchers select individual cases and read the key
number and headnote texts which precede the actual opinion, West
succeeds in framing the issues at stake. For instance, one is struck by the
anachronistic strangeness of the sub-topic “Wisdom, Judgment or Opinion”
in the context of agency discretion.423 Are we indeed classifying the
catastrophic administrative regulation of mountaintop removal mining as
wise?
More substantively, the sub-topic “Persons Entitled to Sue or Seek
Review” is telling.424 Already, in terms of redressability, the researcher is
told that only “persons” are “entitled” to seek relief.425 What of non-human
animals or harms to the greater environment? As Delgado points out, there
exists “discussions of novel theories for nontraditional plaintiffs, such
as . . . animals, indeterminate plaintiffs, or inanimate objects.”426 But in
420. Westlaw search performed on Dec. 14, 2014. See, e.g., Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014); Ohio
Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009); Bragg v. W.
Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001). The West headnotes are listed prior to
each decision proper.
421. Thinkable Thoughts, supra note 270, at 311.
422. See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.
423. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d
607 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev’d and vacated sub nom; Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v.
Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009). ‘
424. See 556 F.3d at 177.
425. See id.
426. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320; see also Taimie L. Bryant, Animals
Unmodified: Defining Animals/Defining Human Obligations to Animals, 2006 U. CHI.
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internalizing the explicit category of “Persons Entitled to Sue”—in
accepting this as objective truth, not as an arbitrary classification barrier
that merits de- and reconstruction—such is West’s power in framing, and
thus in constraining, legal thought.427
The classification of “Cognizable Interests and Injuries” also bares close
scrutiny.428 As a term of art, “cognizable injuries” specifically denotes that
“some source of law treats the injury as sufficient to confer on the injured
party the right to bring suit.”429 While the term “cognizable” likely carries
with it an air of rational objectivity,430 such judgments are necessarily
value-based: “deciding which harms are worthy of judicial and societal
attention is an inescapably subjective exercise, informed by social
norms.”431 The West-deployed term “cognizable” cloaks value judgments
in a veneer of neutral rationality, effectively masking the subjective norms
of existing standing doctrine.
Additional mountaintop removal search strategies include using
statutory-based methods and related citation systems. For example, in
retrieving CWA § 404 on WestlawNext (i.e., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344), the
researcher discovers that the statutory section is cross-linked to thousands
LEGAL F. 137, 153-54 (2006) (“Animals’ legal status as potential or current property
and their lack of legal personhood are the grandparents of all specific legal definitions
of animals.”). But see Jessica Chasmar, Argentine Court Rules ‘Sandra’ the Orangutan
has Human Right to Freedom, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/22/argentine-court-rules-sandra-theorangutan-has-hum/ (“A 29-year-old orangutan named Sandra is a ‘non-human person’
with a right to freedom and will be released from the zoo where she is being held, an
Argentine court has ruled.”).
427. Doctrinal reconstruction along more unfortunate lines has allowed for the
historical development of corporate or “artificial persons.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1325 (10th ed. 2014) (“An entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given
certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the
purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a human being.”); Atiba R. Ellis,
Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 722 (2011)
(“Citizens United continues to blur the distinction between artificial persons and
natural persons.”); see also Saru M. Matambanadzo, Embodying Vulnerability: A
Feminist Theory of the Person, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 64 (2012)
(“[E]fforts to expand legal recognition for fetuses and embryos—and the rights arising
from it—may narrow the rights and reproductive choices of women.”).
428. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Aracoma Coal Co.,
556 F.3d at 177.
429. Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV.
373, 388 (2004).
430. Black’s alternatively defines cognizable of as “capable of being known or
recognized.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 427, at 316.
431. Michelle Fon Anne Lee, Surviving Summers, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 413
(2010).
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of legal documents via the annotations in the KeyCite citation
functionality.432 This selection of cross-references is based on the editorial
policies of Thomson Reuters. While over one thousand five hundred law
review articles are listed under KeyCite’s “Citing References” to CWA §
404, just forty-five law review articles are organized under the “Context &
Analysis” section.433 These forty-five highly vetted law review articles
constitute those most likely to be used by the researcher434—but the
overriding question is, by what criteria was this fraction of articles selected
by the publisher?
Under West’s broader “Citing References” section for CWA § 404, the
researcher can view and search within all West-selected citing secondary
resources. But again, questions arise as to the selection criteria. Therefore,
through such citation channeling agents, West influences statutory-based
research methodologies for mountaintop removal research.
In retrieving the identical statutory section (33 U.S.C.S. § 1344) in Lexis
Advance,435 the citing secondary resources are, of course, unique. For
example, similar to West, treatises published under the Reed-Elsevier
umbrella are cross-linked via the statutory section’s citing secondary
resources listed in the Shepard’s citator report.436 So too are over a
thousand law review articles with an entirely different set of “most
relevant” articles listed in the top results as compared to West, thus
exemplifying the subjective nature of editorial discretion.437 That is,
although Westlaw and Lexis draw from a nearly identical pool of law
review journals, because the relevancy dictates and editorial policies differ
on the two databases, the top or listed results (law review articles, in this
context) often differ as well.
2. Alternative Legal Resources
To avoid such commercial channeling agents entirely, a researcher may
consider utilizing alternative legal resources.
In searching for
“mountaintop removal” on GPO FDsys, one can readily retrieve such
432. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-209). Westlaw
search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.
433. Westlaw search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.
434. Telephone interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters
(Oct. 4, 2014).
435. 33 U.S.C.S. § 1344 (2014) (LEXIS through P.L. 113-203). If the resources and
time are available, the reformist-minded researcher might consider using the analytical
materials from both premier legal databases (or on Bloomberg Law, etc.) in order to
gain as broad a perspective as possible.
436. Lexis search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.
437. Lexis search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.
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decisions as Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co.
through the official “United States Courts Opinion Collection.”438 The full
texts of such decisions are devoid of all elements from the West Topic and
Key Number system, KeyCite, and so on. Likewise, CWA § 404, as
retrieved on the Cornell Legal Information Institute, is unencumbered by
editorially selected cross-references within the KeyCite or Shepard’s
citators.439 On these more neutral, alternative legal resources, a researcher
may then analyze the retrieved primary authorities with the commercial
channeling agents removed. As the keyword searches performed on such
alternative resources are free from West algorithm enhancements, so too
will the researcher likely benefit from search results differing from those on
high-end legal databases.
3. Legal Scholarly and Multidisciplinary Research: Feminist Approach
After thus internalizing the existing mountaintop removal landscape
through doctrinal research methodologies and thereafter deconstructing and
sidestepping as appropriate the channeling influence of commercial legal
databases, the critical researcher may next turn to commentaries in
scholarly legal and cross- and multidisciplinary resources. For instance, a
broad keyword search for “mountaintop removal & reform” in the “Law
Reviews & Journals” sub-database in WestlawNext produces over nine
thousand results—the top results of which, as selected by West’s relevancy
dictates, are indeed of interest.440
While many of the top retrieved articles from such a broad search are
pertinent, the researcher ought to remember that such results are based on
the subjective determinants of the West and Lexis systems.441 In other
words, the critical researcher should consciously and continuously
negotiate with online search systems; in exerting agency over retrieved
results, as possible, through such means as targeted Boolean searching and
sustained keyword innovation. For example, the syntactical calculi
generated through the Boolean search “mountaintop removal” /p
“environmental justice” & income produces more focused results in
WestlawNext (i.e., just seven retrieved articles), as compared to the broader
search above.442 Additional law review articles (not available on the
438. United
States
Courts
Opinions,
GPO
FDSYS,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection .action?collectionCode=USCOURTS (last
visited May 2, 2015).
439. U.S. Code: Table of Contents, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text (last visited May 2, 2015).
440. Westlaw search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.
441. See Part II(C).
442. See Searching with Boolean Terms & Connectors, WESTLAWNEXT,
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commercial legal databases) can be found through similar searches on
SSRN, the Bepress Law Reviews Commons, HeinOnline, and Google
Scholar.443 Accordingly, the material discussed below is based on such
numerous and varied searches.
a. Environmental Justice
An overarching, particularly useful discourse as found by searching in
law journal sub-databases and online law review repositories involves the
intersection of environmental law and critical theory.444 In its first few
decades, “environmental law took root as a reformist project that avoided
the critical concerns of ‘race, class, and gender’ and the postmodern
insights of late twentieth social thinking and practice.”445 However, in
more recent years, scholars have begun examining environmental law in
the context of “a larger critical theoretical base,” an immensely important
project as “the exploitation of the environment with which environmental
law is concerned props up the unjust modernism with which critical theory
is concerned.”446
Like other contemporary critical movements, many scholars active in
this vein are skeptical of internal, or traditional, law reform initiatives
altogether, instead championing more revolutionary sociopolitical and
economic “systemic re-formation.”447 Such projects, while certainly
admirable, are largely beyond the scope of this Article—and, in any event,
are not necessarily mutually exclusive with more incremental strategies of
reform, as advocated in the general critical legal research literature.
Therefore, the discussion here is concerned mostly with critical reform in
the less radicalized context: that is, in crafting progressive, largely internal
legal reforms (i.e., “intra-systemic ‘reform’”) through examining the
intersection of environmental law and critical theory.448
Environmental justice is a prominent sub-discourse within the broader
critical environmentalist movement. The basic tenets of environmental
justice are as follows:
The general thrust of environmental justice is a proportionate share issue

https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2/L-362608.pdf (last visited
May 2, 2015).
443. See Arewa, supra note 49, at 809.
444. See generally M’Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 158.
445. Id. at 1107-10 (proposing a new movement entitled green legal theory).
446. Id.
447. Id. at 1027.
448. Id. at 1113.
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regarding environmental burdens. . . . Overall, the concept is that when
living in an industrialized society, there are both benefits and burdens
associated with environmental issues, and when environmental injustice
occurs, those burdens are disproportionately thrust upon low-income
449
communities and communities of color.

Therefore, environmental justice advocates focus on the unjust societal
distributions of environmental harms.
Third wave critical scholars have built upon the pioneering work of
environmental justice advocates. Post-essentialist projects have included
going “beyond treating race as fixed and biological. It also entails
expanding environmental justice to recognize that each racial group is
differently situated according to its specific socio-economic needs, political
power, cultural values, and group goals.”450 Such insights “enable[]
scholars and activists to better grapple with varying forms of subordination
and to tailor specific remedies for the harms that are specific to each racial
community.”451
The environmental justice movement has gained considerable traction
not just within the academy, but also within the actual environmental
regulatory framework. Environmental Justice Executive Order (E.O.
12,898), handed down by President Clinton, and reinvigorated by President
Obama, “requires administrative agencies to evaluate the socioeconomic
and racial characteristics of communities” located in close proximity to
“locally undesirable land uses” such as landfills, hazardous waste sites, and
other environmental hazards.452
In the last half decade, the “EPA has relied on emerging science and
President Clinton’s executive order on Environmental Justice to rigorously
review permits for mountaintop removal mining, and to determine when its

449. Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice-Does
Green Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2014). See generally
Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998); Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination:
The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility
Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211 (1994).
450. Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 311, 359 (2001).
451. Id.
452. John J. Fahsbender, An Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected
Neighborhood in the Environmental Justice Context, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 120, 202,
207 (1996) (citing Exec. Order No. 12898, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,087, 66,087 (Oct. 25,
2011)).
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veto authority under CWA § 404(c) should be used to block a permit.”453
Furthermore, as codified at 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1), the Corps is required
to conduct a pre-permit public interest review process that similarly
accounts for the “needs and welfare of the people.”454 The environmental
justice movement then has made substantial inroads in framing the
debate—and even in influencing outcomes—on mountaintop removal
mining regulation.
The law review literature is rife with discussion on environmental justice
in the context of mountaintop removal mining.455 Scholars have noted that
mountaintop removal “creates problems for people living near blasting
sites, sending debris into people’s homes, polluting the water, and causing
noise and land disturbance,” and these citizens most often are from “poor,
rural communities with high unemployment rates and low to moderate
development, who have lived on the land for generations.”456 This dire
situation has led one commentator to proclaim that in fact “mountaintop
removal exemplifies the conditions that give rise to environmental justice
issues.”457
Critical attention has focused primarily on low-income Appalachian
communities.458 Due to demographics, “mountaintop removal lacks the
racial element of the paradigmatic environmental injustice cases.”459
However, the prominent legal scholarly discourse on mountaintop removal
conspicuously lacks a vitally applicable progressive strain: a dedicated

453. Bomyea, supra note 348, at 254.
454. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2014).
455. See generally Pick and Shovel, supra note 38; Paben, supra note 449; Smith,

supra note 29; Bomyea, supra note 348.
456. James M. Auslander, Reversing the Flow: The Interconnectivity of
Environmental Law in Addressing External Threats to Protected Lands and Waters, 30
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 481, 487-88 (2006).
457. Smith, supra note 29, at 171.
458. See sources cited supra note 455.
459. Gersen, supra note 32, at 466. This is not to say that a CRT or related analysis
ought not to have a role in mountaintop removal mining critiques—indeed, such an
analysis would constitute a vital contribution to the literature. Barry writes more on this
subject:
Because West Virginia is largely white, and the grassroots component of the anti-MTR
movement primarily consists of white women, racial distinctions intersect with class
and gender in important ways in coalfield culture. Examining cultural stereotypes of
Appalachians, particularly the long-standing “hillbilly,” and situating this symbol
within cultural studies scholarship on whiteness, reveals complex racial and class-based
identities that have interesting environmental justice connections.
STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 96-97; see also sources cited supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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feminist analysis.460 The addition of such an analysis could lead to crucial
law reform initiatives.
b. Feminism and Environmental Justice
The reformist-minded researcher generally may be aware that feminist
discourses exist within the broader critical work on environmental law.
But when searching for the intersection of feminist thought and
mountaintop removal mining, virtually no pertinent results return on the
law journal sub-databases in Westlaw and Lexis.461
Similarly, the mountaintop removal primary authority discussed above
(e.g., the mandated public interest review criteria) eschews a substantive
analysis that extends beyond low-income populations in Appalachia.462
Therefore, the researcher discovers that feminist thought—among other
potentially pertinent discourses, such as critical race theory,463
masculinities theory,464 or queer legal theory465—is absent altogether from
both primary authority and the scholarly legal literature covering critical
reforms for mountaintop removal mining.
As Delgado and Stefancic demonstrate, the requisite elements for new
law reform initiatives may “lie somewhere in a database,” but putting such
elements “together in a novel way must come from a human researcher.”466
In this instance, conducting a broader search for feminism and
environmental issues (i.e., beyond the specific context of mountaintop
removal mining) yields beneficial results—that can, in turn, be applied to
the law governing mountaintop removal.
Robert R.M. Verchick, for instance, writes about “insights that derive
from both feminism and the environmental justice movement.”467 As
460. But see Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 26 (1996) (explaining that a feminist
“focus does not seek to minimize the role that racism, classism, and other forms of
discrimination play in environmental justice issues. Rather, [such an approach may]
acknowledge the relationship among many such biases.”).
461. Westlaw and Lexis searches performed on Dec. 14, 2014.
462. See sources cited supra note 351.
463. See sources cited supra note 459.
464. See generally Rebecca R. Scott, Dependent Masculinity and Political Culture
in Pro-Mountaintop Removal Discourse: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Dragline. 33 FEMINIST STUD. 484 (2007).
465. See Bud W. Jerke, Queer Ruralism, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 259, 305 (2011)
(“Ruralism and queer metronormativity intersect to create a particularly pernicious
form of discrimination for queer rural dwellers: queer ruralism; that is, structural
discrimination stemming from being queer and residing in a rural area.”).
466. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 321.
467. Robert R.M. Verchick, Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental Justice, 13
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 791, 792 (2008) [hereinafter Katrina].
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Verchick points out, the “most visible and effective environmental justice
organizations in the country are led by and consist mainly of women.”468
Therefore, while the environmental justice movement is “an environmental
movement, a civil rights movement, and a public health movement, it is
also, quite literally, a women’s movement, and . . . a feminist movement as
well.”469
Environmental justice advocates “pursue[] goals important to many
women,” because “women may be more vulnerable than men to many
environmental dangers.”470 Such dangers include an increased “likelihood
of suffering adverse health effects from exposure to certain pollutants,” due
to the fact that women have a higher average body fat than men—and
certain pollutants tend to “bioaccumulate in fatty tissue.”471 Environmental
harms also “threaten[] women’s capacity to bear and nurse healthy
children.”472 Finally, insofar as women “remain the primary caregivers in
their homes and communities,” strong regard “for their own health and that
of their family remains a primary concern.”473
Many traditional feminist methodologies have been deployed within the
environmental justice movement. A central feminist methodology is
“unmasking patriarchy” through demonstrating how supposedly neutral
laws in fact perpetuate white male supremacy.474 Remedying such biases
may involve taking into account “the lives or feelings of women” through
“blending those outside experiences into the political or legal process.”475
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-36.
Id. at 32; NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
A PRIMER 46 (2006) (citing Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 829, 836-37 (1990)); Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding Common Feminist
Ground: The Role of the Next Generation in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory, 20 DUKE
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 267 (2013) (“Katharine Bartlett’s work on feminist legal
methodology has distilled the fundamentals of feminist methods to unmasking
patriarchy, contextual reasoning, and consciousness-raising, all of which require
incorporation of the personal experience.”). But see Levit, supra note 211, at 12
(arguing that contemporary theorists ought to move behind traditional feminist
methodologies and incorporate such movements as “complexity theory” that “looks at
complex dynamics of relationships and their interactions with institutions.”); Adam P.
Romero, Book Review: Split Decisions: How and Why to Take A Break from Feminism
by Janet Halley Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal
Theories, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 240 (2007) (“[W]ithout denying that many
feminist projects are expressly concerned with patriarchal and, more generally,
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In the environmental justice context, unmasked biases include
identifying workplace contaminant laws that set minimum acceptable
levels as being “safe for male workers, but not female workers.”476 Other
examples include the “elevation of data crunching and technical jargon
over common sense and community outreach,” as the former is associated
with white male-dominated professions, while the latter reflects the selfreported approach of many women grassroots activists.477 The focus that
“mainstream environmental groups place on litigation and other win/lose
methods of problem solving” also is associated with “male attitudes.”478
Other feminist methodologies used within the environmental justice
movement include contextual reasoning and consciousness-raising.
Contextual reasoning pertains to notions of the personal being political, in
that activism and reform efforts of all varieties ought to account for the
“influence of personal experience on law.”479 This may involve thrusting
“previously unheard ‘bottom-up’ perspectives” of subordinated groups to
the forefront of environmental legislative, judicial, and administrative
policymaking in addition to related activist movements.480
Consciousness-raising is defined as “the commitment to collective
engagement, the public significance of private matters, and the acceptance
of individual perspective.”481 Consciousness-raising, in the context of
environmental justice, also focuses on the importance of elevating the
experiences of environmentally-affected subordinated groups.482
A keystone discourse that likely can shed much light on mountaintop
removal reform initiatives is the movement known as ecofeminism.
Associated with such scholars as Ellen O’Loughlin, Val Plumwood, and
Vandana Shiva, third wave ecofeminism, which “embraces strategic uses of

gendered inequalities and subordination, we might recast ‘unmasking patriarchy’ as
‘asking the gender question.’ Cast as a question, the method is released from any
substantive and prescriptive commitments attendant to a characterization in terms of
patriarchy.”); Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Land Use—Environmental Law Distinction: A
Geo-Feminist Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 55, 77 (2002) (“While
traditional legal methodology seeks predictability and certainty, feminist legal methods
value flexibility in legal rules and seek to identify missing points of view. Three such
methods are often associated with feminism: asking the ‘woman question,’ feminist
practical reasoning, and consciousness raising.”).
476. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 38.
477. Id. at 40.
478. Id. at 41.
479. Id. at 43-44; see sources cited supra note 475.
480. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 46.
481. Id. at 52.
482. Id. at 52-54.
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essentialism,”483 is a supremely multivocal movement.484 Ecofeminism
explores the intersection of feminism and environmental concerns—but in
accomplishing this, deploys a much broader analytical framework.
Since the dynamic of oppression is similar (though not identical or
interchangeable) among oppressed peoples, and since most women
experience this dynamic in more than one way (that is, through the
dynamics of racism, classism, heterosexism, and ageism, as well as
sexism), ecofeminism, in order to fight the oppression of women and
nature, must look at more than just the ways in which sexism is related to
485
naturism.

The crux of ecofeminism then is that all forms of subordination are, in
crucial ways, interlinked, stemming from a “shared dynamic of separation,
fear, and resentment”486 characteristic of “capitalist, patriarchal forces.”487
Stated otherwise, core characteristics of these dominant paradigms include
“hierarchical thinking, a logic of domination, and normative dualisms such
as the separation of humans from nature.”488 This yields the conclusion
that meaningful environmental law reform requires “a multi-layered
analysis of environmental exploitation in the context of many kinds of
discrimination.”489
All too often, the destruction of the environment and the subordination
of marginalized groups are approached as inherently separate issues, each
having its own causes and each requiring discrete solutions. For instance,
curtailing environmental destruction may not be viewed as a requisite for a

483. Maggie Ellinger-Locke, Food Sovereignty Is A Gendered Issue, 18 BUFF.
ENVTL. L. J. 157, 188 (2011). See generally MARIA MIES & VANDANA SHIVA,
ECOFEMINISM (1993); Ellen O’Loughlin, Questioning Sour Grapes: Ecofeminism and
the United Farm Workers Grape Boycott, in ECOFEMINISM: WOMEN, ANIMALS,
NATURE 146 (Greta Gaard ed., 2010); Chaone Mallory, Acts of Objectification and the
Repudiation of Dominance: Leopold, Ecofeminism, and the Ecological Narrative, 6
ETHICS & ENV’T 59 (2001); Val Plumwood, Ecosocial Feminism as General Theory of
Oppression, in ECOLOGY: KEY CONCEPTS IN CRITICAL THEORY (Carolyn Merchant ed.,
1999).
484. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 55.
485. O’Loughlin, supra note 483, at 148.
486. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 57.
487. STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 114.
488. Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, An Ecofeminist Legal Critique of Canadian
Environmental Law: The Case Study of Genetically Modified Foods, 26 WINDSOR REV.
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 129, 138 (2009).
489. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 58.
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more just distribution of environmental harms among humans.490
Therefore, the “ecofeminist view of compound oppression contributes
something new,” in that it “makes the avoidance of compound oppressions
conceptually impossible: to take the ‘eco’ or the ‘feminism’ out of
ecofeminism would, after all, negate the whole idea.”491 Ecofeminism then
is a holistic approach that aims to “simultaneously us[e] the common goals
of saving nature and ending oppression” to effect progressive change.492
The researcher now has learned of pertinent legal scholarly discourses
regarding potential avenues for feminist-based reform. Novel ideas
proffered by commercial legal databases and online repositories of legal
scholarship have been, in this specific context, largely exhausted. But what
of any remaining insights proffered by cross- and multidisciplinary
resources? What of going beyond commercial legal databases?
While Westlaw and Lexis fail to offer a feminist analysis of the law
governing mountaintop removal mining, in searching “outside the system
box” of these commercial legal databases, a researcher succeeds in
discovering such materials that begin to fill the gap.493 In other words, a
number of non-legal scholars indeed have proffered a feminist analysis of
mountaintop removal, which may be of great benefit to the attorney
searching for innovative ideas for feminist-inspired law reform
initiatives.494 In actually locating such materials, the materials below were
found via searches in such resources as Google Books and Scholar,
EbscoHost, JSTOR, SSRN, and others.
In Standing Our Ground: Women, Environmental Justice, and the Fight
to End Mountaintop Removal, Joyce M. Barry “expands the EJ framework

490. See McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 145 (“We do not seek to protect
nature from all harm, because of its inherent value. Instead, we seek to regulate how
much harm is done, stopping short only when we might harm our own self interests.”
(quoting Elaine Hughes, Fishwives and Other Tails: Ecofeminism and Environmental
Law 8 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 502, 515 (1995))).
491. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 58.
492. Id. at 60.
493. Farmer, supra note 3, at 403.
494. See generally STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27; Mountaineers, supra
note 41; Scott, supra note 464; SHANNON BELL, OUR ROOTS RUN DEEP AS IRON WEED
(2013); REBECCA R. SCOTT, REMOVING MOUNTAINS: EXTRACTING NATURE AND
IDENTITY IN THE APPALACHIAN COALFIELDS (2010); Rebecca Spence, Feminism,
Mountain Top Removal, and Appalachian Identity, VOICES OF CLAREMONT GRADUATE
UNIV. 258 (2011); Shannon E. Bell & Yvonne A. Braun, Coal, Identity, and the
Gendering of Environmental Justice Activism in Central Appalachia, 24.6 GENDER &
SOC’Y 794 (2010); Joyce M. Barry, “A Small Group of Thoughtful, Committed
Citizens”: Women’s Activism, Environmental Justice, and the Coal River Mountain
Watch, 1.1 ENVTL. JUST. 25 (2008).
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by centralizing gender in this analysis of women’s involvement in the
movement to end mountaintop removal coal mining in Appalachia.”495 In
contrast to the primary and scholarly-analytical resources in the
commercial legal databases and elsewhere, Barry argues persuasively that
“[g]ender is at the heart of the anti-MTR movement in Appalachia.”496
In localizing many of the feminist critical insights above to the
Appalachian mountaintop removal context, Barry demonstrates that women
in Appalachia share a disproportionate burden of the harms wrought by
mountaintop removal mining. In a general sense, “[w]omen in central
Appalachia, particularly in the coalfields . . . lack social, political, and
economic equality with men.”497 The root cause of these inequities in large
part can be traced to the systemic forces undergirding the natural resource
extraction industry.
For West Virginians, it is the coal industry, or “king coal,” that has
systematically arranged the state’s resources for its benefit, while leaving
state citizens politically and economically powerless. . . . Economic
insecurity is particularly devastating to rural women, many of whom
head families living in poverty. It is these women who have the primary
responsibility of maintaining the domestic sphere in incredibly trying
circumstances. Ultimately, women, with their productive or social
reproductive work, suffer the harshest effects of all social ills, whether
498
those ills are poverty, unemployment, or environmental destruction.

In terms of deleterious health effects, women may be more vulnerable
than men to some pollutants associated with mountaintop removal mining,
because through higher fat ratios, “women are particularly vulnerable to the
accumulation of chemicals.”499 Women also may “potentially pass these
toxins on their fetuses and/or children.”500 That recent studies establish a
link between mountaintop removal mining and birth defects only confirms
“the ways in which the body, and biological differences between men and
women and their susceptibility to environmental toxins, is linked to
material realities.”501
Barry also demonstrates that, in the “effort to end mountaintop removal
coal mining in Appalachia, women activists are a vital part of the
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.

STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 41.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 20.
Mountaineers, supra note 41, at 119.
STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 54.
Id.
Id.
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movement—representing in large numbers and in some cases shaping the
nature of EJ campaigns.”502 Women therefore occupy—and have long
occupied—leadership and frontline activist roles in the anti-mountaintop
removal movement, with self-reported motivations stemming from “a
desire to keep their families, community, and natural environment safe and
healthy for present and future generations.”503
Barry also deploys an explicitly ecofeminist lens in her analysis of the
anti-mountaintop removal movement. She illustrates that for “[w]omen . . .
who organize or join grassroots efforts” in Appalachia, “[c]oncerns for
human health, particularly for the young” are of extreme importance.504
However, women activists also “recognize links between both cultural and
environmental annihilation,” and therefore “[i]n their efforts to end MTR,
women environmental justice activists link local culture to the natural
environment, particularly its mountains.”505
c. Feminist-Based Reforms to Mountaintop Removal Law
With such a complement of primary authority, legal-analytical, and
critical cross- and multidisciplinary materials identified, the reformistminded attorney may now, as Delgado and Stefancic advise, unplug from
research resources entirely and engage in “the free association of ideas,
policies, and social needs.”506 Now is the time to “turn [the] system on its
side” and ask what is missing, in terms of determining how, in this
scenario, feminist insights might best inspire law reform initiatives for
mountaintop removal mining.507 Of course, the aim of this Article is not to
offer comprehensive reform strategies; rather, the purpose is to engage in a
tentative analysis in order to showcase the transformative potential of
critical research strategies—across diverse areas of Appalachian law.
To begin, the researcher may speculate on how the law governing
mountaintop removal—or even on how arguments proffered, to date, by
mountaintop removal law reform advocates—may in fact perpetuate the
patriarchy. For example, the feminist analyses proffered by Barry and
others demonstrate that women in Appalachia share a disproportionate
burden of the harms caused by mountaintop removal.508 In terms of
deleterious health effects, women indeed may be more susceptible to

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 41, 55.
Id. at 64, 116.
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328.
Id. at 224.
See Part III(B)(3)(b).
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certain mountaintop removal pollutants than men (although the science is
still emerging),509 and the birth defects demonstrably caused by
mountaintop removal surely are societal harms that affect women more
substantially (i.e., as women historically have been the primary caretakers
of children).510 In the broader sense discussed above (e.g., poverty,
unemployment, familial hardships, etc.), Appalachian women “suffer the
harshest effects of all social ills” caused by mountaintop removal
operations.511
In the primary authority and legal analytical materials to date, this
inequitable sex- and gender-based distribution of societal harms has not
been identified as a prominent issue. But regarding primary authority
specifically, where might attorneys look to implement such reforms?
For one, the EPA’s public interest review requirements for the issuance
of mountaintop removal permits as associated with the pre-permit
reviews512 could be targeted as a site for increased incorporation of such
insights. Through the public interest review process, the EPA specifically
has “directed its regional offices,” prior to Corps permit approvals, to
“analyze and provide comment to the Corps on such issues as ‘the potential
for disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects on low-income and minority populations.’”513
The
disproportionately economic effects may be targeted as well: “The Corps
regularly considers the economic ramifications of a proposal in its public
interest review.”514 These EPA public interest directives serve as an ideal
site from which to require an analysis that explicitly and comprehensively
accounts for the unique harms to Appalachian women. In short, the EPA
could direct the Corps to analyze the “disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects on low-income, minority[, and
female] populations.”515
509. See COPELAND, supra note 321, at 17; STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27,
at 54-55; Ahern et al., supra note 336, at 838.
510. See Part III(B)(3)(b).
511. Mountaineers, supra note 41, at 119.
512. See sources cited supra note 348.
513. Bomyea, supra note 348, at 235 (quoting Communities Against Runway
Expansion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 355 F.3d 678, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
514. FEDERAL REGULATION OF WETLANDS, ST051 ALI-CLE 933, 995 (2012).
515. See also Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 87 (“Regulatory agencies could also
be required to consider the distributional effects that their actions have on women and
children.”); Rachel Kalman, EPA’s Mercury Cap and Trade Rule: An Environmental
Injustice for Women, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 111, 113 (2006) (“Executive Order
12,898 requir[es] federal agencies to consider the effects of their programs, policies,
and activities on minority and low-income populations . . . . Executive Order 12,898
formalizes the principles of environmental justice and obligates federal agencies to
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The EPA also could incorporate related reforms into its analyses
regarding permit vetoes under CWA § 404(c). In the last half decade, the
public interest criteria based on E.O. 12,898 has been deployed by the EPA
not just in its pre-permit directives to the Corps, but also “to determine
when its veto authority under CWA § 404(c) should be used to block a
Therefore, here too the EPA may incorporate the
permit.”516
disproportionate health, environmental, and economic effects of
mountaintop removal mining, as borne by Appalachian women, into its
analysis of when a CWA § 404(c) veto is appropriate. That the EPA’s
CWA § 404(c) veto power recently has been affirmed in Mingo Logan
Coal Co. v. U.S. E.P.A. only demonstrates the strengths of this tactic.517
In National Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, the D.C. Circuit also affirmed the
EPA’s extra-statutory guidance prerogatives,518 in holding that the EPA
could lawfully develop interagency coordination plans with the Corps in a
process not expressly authorized by the CWA.519 In these extra-statutory
guidance functions, the EPA may direct the Corps to adopt environmental
review analyses that account for disproportionate sex- and gender-based
environmental harms.
In terms of contextual reasoning and consciousness-raising in
Appalachia, additional strategies may involve ensuring a strong influence
of personal experience in mountaintop removal law reform initiatives.
Appalachian women long have been at the forefront of grassroots antimountaintop removal efforts—but questions remain over whether such
“‘bottom-up’ perspectives” are prominent components of all legal and
related socio-institutional sites for change.520
Personal experience already plays a role in the public interest review
adhere to them, yet it makes no mention of gender as a factor to be considered in
agency decisions.”) (emphasis added). But of course, we also should be wary any such
universalized sex- or gender-based characterization or analysis: an “integrated
particularized approach” ought to be highlighted in Appalachia, which exhibits “greater
complexity based on each community’s cultural, historical, and political experience and
its specific needs and goals.” Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 450, at 360. Rather
presciently, Marx once defined critical theory as the “self-clarification of the struggles
and wishes of our age.” Karl Marx, Letter to A. Ruge, September 1843, in KARL MARX:
EARLY WRITINGS 209 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Vintage Books
1975) (emphasis added). Individual “struggles and wishes” of Appalachian coalfield
residents must be taken into account. Id.
516. Bomyea, supra note 348, at 254.
517. Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014).
518. Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
519. Id. at 253.
520. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 46.
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process associated with the EPA’s pre-permit directives. E.O. 12,898
“compels agencies to increase opportunities for public participation in
federal decision-making, giving potentially impacted people better access
to the lawmaking process before major decisions are made.”521 In
accordance with this mandate, the EPA has established an Office of
Environmental Justice to “oversee the agency’s implementation of the
order,” which involves, among other functions, providing “low-income and
minority communities in Appalachia” with an “adequate opportunity to
participate in the permitting process.”522 A feminist-based approach might
attempt to broaden and deepen the participation of coalfield communities—
and to concurrently ensure that a full spectrum of voices is heard within the
review process.
But how might such contextual reasoning and consciousness-raising
approaches be further expanded in mountaintop removal reform efforts?
Public health science on mountaintop removal mining is still emerging523
and successful reform efforts likely will depend on the eventual findings—
but who collects such data and how? Verchick directly addresses this
issue: “community activists [argue not only] for greater research into toxic
susceptibility,” but they also demand “gain[ing] more control over how the
evidence is collected and applied.”524 As an example in a different regional
context, a California community demanded that a traditional toxic exposure
study conducted on its residents be tempered with a “context-based survey”
devised through “group discussion” by the residents themselves.525 In
adopting such a methodology, the “community’s participation in solving
the problem places them on a more equal footing with the outside
researchers,” and such an active community role may “discourage
researchers from viewing them as mere ‘victims’ or sources of raw data in
the future.”526 Similarly, coalfield residents in Appalachia also might adopt
a more proactive approach in pertinent public health research—the findings
of which surely will impact future mountaintop removal reform efforts.
Such are examples of potential feminist-based reforms to the permitting
scheme governing mountaintop removal and to related sites for change, like
the public health complex. However, mountaintop removal mining may
also be governed through “the common law of torts and property,” among
other primary authority alternatives.527 How might an attorney explore
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

Bomyea, supra note 348, at 234.
Id. at 235.
See COPELAND, supra note 321, at 17.
Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 72.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Smith, supra note 29, at 178.
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these legal avenues of reform?
Developing strategies to seek direct compensation for economic
damages—perhaps through toxic tort actions or legislative compensation
schemes528—are compelling options. As Verchick points out in Katrina,
Feminism, and Environmental Justice, “Feminists . . . are concerned with
exposure and vulnerability,” but “[v]ulnerability is a tricky concept for
feminists because, in the past, women were denied many opportunities in
the public sphere because of false notions of female delicacy.”529
Nevertheless, through strategic uses of essentialism, many “feminists
correctly argue that some vulnerabilities are real and necessary to take into
account.”530
Verchick then introduces a rudimentary calculus illustrating how
economic compensation is appropriate for environmental harms suffered
disproportionality by women, given the common sense dictates of
distributive justice.531
If women are indeed suffering more health and economic harms, justice
demands that they be compensated. “H = A + E + V where H is
“environmental harm,” A is “agent,” E is “exposure,” and V is
“vulnerability.” Neither feminists nor environmental justice advocates
put the idea in such formulaic terms, but both pay close attention to
harmful agents, exposure, and vulnerability. Both kinds of activists are
concerned with identifying agents of harm and demanding accountability
532
from actors that create them.

In applying this calculus to mountaintop removal, potential agents
include the mechanisms through which health and economic harms are
wrought on coalfield communities (e.g., toxins released during the mining
process), exposure as the coalfield communities’ various forms of damages
suffered from these harms, and vulnerability in part relates to women’s
increased susceptibility to many such forms of damages.533 Justice may
528. See ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL
THEORY 59 (2009) (discussing toxic tort litigation); Katrina, supra note 467, at 799
(discussing legislative compensation schemes).
529. Katrina, supra note 467, at 792–93.
530. Id. at 793.
531. But see McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 144-45 (“Feminist
jurisprudence emphasizes how the law, its processes and creators misunderstand and
undervalue the kinds of harm women experience . . . . [Existing law] emphasizes
individual and pecuniary harms while failing to ‘see’ collective and non-pecuniary
harms.”).
532. Katrina, supra note 467, at 792.
533. See Part III(B)(3)(b)..
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then demand imposing economic accountability on the actors responsible
for these harms: mountaintop removal operators. As Verchick states: “This
emphasis on compensatory liability echoes the sentiment of the early
feminist Mary Wollstonecraft that ‘[i]t is justice, not charity, that is
wanting in the world!’”534
In considering more transformative strategies, the core tenets of
ecofeminism also might assist in radically “imagining new worlds” of
mountaintop removal reform—in terms of both ending mountaintop
removal mining and in pursuing strategies of post-coal Appalachian
societal reconstruction, which, in the end, may be one in the same issue.535
As an example of such a “re-visioning” strategy in another context,
Delgado and Stefancic posit: “what if one imagined a world where the duty
to make good for old injuries increased, rather than decreased, over
time[?]”536 One may begin asking similar such novel questions in “revisioning” the law governing mountaintop removal mining.537
Ecofeminism aims to “simultaneously us[e] the common goals of saving
nature and ending oppression” to effect progressive change.538 Much in
line with the key critical research methodologies outlined by Delgado and
Stefancic, “[e]cofeminism can improve environmental law by proposing
alternative conceptual frameworks.”539
In the context of mountaintop removal mining, such legal
reconceptualization efforts may begin with an examination of how
compound oppressions associated with the mining industry (i.e., the
common domination of nature, women, minorities, low-income
populations, non-human animals, and other subordinated groups) have not
been sufficiently addressed in a holistic sociolegal fashion.
Reform efforts might highlight the connections among these multiple
forms of domination at work in mountaintop removal mining—and then
“uncover their common systemic causes.”540 Indeed, any law reform
efforts that fail to uncover—and to then account for—such common
systemic causes may be “at best incomplete and at worst simply
inadequate.”541
534. Katrina, supra note 467, at 792 (quoting MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 71 (1792) (Carol H. Poston ed., 1975)).
535. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 322.
536. Id.
537. McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 178.
538. Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 60.
539. McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 133.
540. Id. at 136.
541. Id. at 137 (quoting Karen J. Warren, The Power and the Promise of Ecological
Feminism 12 ENVTL. ETHICS 125 (1990)).
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The dominant patriarchal and liberal paradigms that undergird the
natural resource extraction industry surely constitute such common
systemic harms in Appalachia. Is it so surprising the paradigmatic forces
of Westernism simultaneously drive such widespread acts as the wholesale
poisoning of low-income coalfield communities, a disproportionate
burdening of Appalachian women, the obliteration of Appalachian
ecosystems, and the other devastating societal and ecological harms
wrought on the region as a whole? Perhaps not. Therefore, in Delgado and
Stefancic’s terms, the question becomes: can one imagine a world in which
mountaintop removal mining reform encompasses the common systemic
causes at work in the Appalachian region? What might such reforms
entail?
It seems likely that deep reforms of this nature will require a radical
social and economic restructuring of Appalachia—based largely along
ecofeminist lines. Hearteningly, as Barry reports, an overarching vision of
such reforms, already shared by many women activists in Appalachia, is
aptly characterized as an ecofeminist one.
That is, “[w]omen
environmental justice activists,” in fighting the coal industry in Appalachia,
have provided “an alternative vision that understands and critiques” the
excesses of late capitalism—and its systemic forms of subordination.542
Such activists “in West Virginia promote living economies through
sustainable development of the area’s renewable natural resources,” which
may be defined, in large part, by “co-ownership and coproduction, on
sharing and participation.”543 Through pursuing such transformative ends,
542. STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 149.
543. Id.; see also Greta Gaard, Toward New EcoMasculinities, EcoGenders, and

EcoSexualities, in ECOFEMINISM: FEMINIST INTERSECTIONS WITH OTHER ANIMALS AND
EARTH 225 (Carol J. Adams & Lori Gruen eds., 2014) (“For any egalitarian
socioeconomic and eco-political transformation, such as that advocated by
ecofeminism to be possible, both individuals and institutions need to shift away from
overvaluing exclusively white, male, and masculinized attributes and behaviors, jobs,
environments, economic practices, laws and political practices, in order to recognize
and enact eco-political sustainability and ecological genders.”); DAVID PEPPER, ECOSOCIALISM: FROM DEEP ECOLOGY TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 218-22 (2002); Patricia E.
Perkins, Feminist Ecological Economics and Sustainability, 9.3 J. OF BIOECON. 227,
228-39 (2007); Mary Mellor, Ecofeminist Political Economy 1.1 INT’L J. OF GREEN
ECON 139, 145-48 (2006); For concrete Appalachian reform proposals to date see
Patrick C. McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning A Blind Eye to Environmental and
Social Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 305, 414-15
(2013) (“[Appalachian revitalization efforts include] a proposal to create a permanent
mineral severance tax trust fund and suggestions for growing ‘green collar’ jobs
through creation of a sustainable forestry industry . . . . [in addition to] economic
diversification in ‘the arts, education and workforce development, entrepreneurship,
environmental restoration, health and community-based services [etc.] . . . ‘“ (quoting
Randal A. Strobo, The Shape of Appalachia to Come: Coal in a Transitional Economy,
THE
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a more just and eco-viable future may be possible for the region.
V. CONCLUSION
For over a century, dedicated grassroots activists, legal reformers, and
ordinary citizens have struggled to free central Appalachia from the natural
resource extraction industry and its seemingly eternal pact with the region’s
captured ruling elites. Much good work has been done, but the purpose of
this Article is to bring to light a novel set of critical methodologies that
may assist in ushering in a new era of change and renewal.
The manner in which our laws and legal discourses are organized,
accessed, and analyzed has a vital impact on research outcomes. As
outlined in this Article, the research paradigm by which such outcomes are
reached is defined wholly by insidious systems of constraint. In
examining—and transcending—such systems, and in adopting approaches
that maximize creative law reform potential, a great deal may be
accomplished by the reformist-minded attorney.
This Article puts forth just one such version of a reconstructed legal
research process, and an accompanying illustration of how it might be used
to shape new reforms. However, the overarching aim is for activists and
reformers to creatively engage with, critique, expand upon, and ultimately
deploy such critical legal research strategies to effect meaningful change in
Appalachia—and beyond.

4 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 91, 105 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dflsc/vol4/iss1/5/.)).
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